This is "fixed" in DoH the same way it's "fixed" for encrypted SNI: by having a small number of superproviders servicing millions of domains.

With current encrypted SNI proposal, your privacy (between you and the superprovider) is /improved/ by talking to a site behind a large aggregating provider. It sucks (since the superprovider still sees everything), but that's how it is.

edit: added clarifications in (parens)

I'm more worried about persistent, authenticated/ID-linked TCP connections (e.g. APNS) providing the client IP over time to an application service provider (e.g. Apple, Slack, Google, Microsoft, et c), that is, city-level geolocation track history via geoip, than I am the ISP or carrier snooping on what websites I connect to.

Every iPhone connects to APNS for push notifications and stays connected, and, last I looked at the protocol, the client certificate was linked to the device serial number. That's quite a geoip tracklog dataset, and AFAIK you can't turn it off.

It's to the point now that to keep my city-level location private from Apple, I'm not putting SIMs in any of my iPhones/iPads any longer, and carrying a battery powered VPN travel router (with a SIM uplink in it) for them to talk to. Super annoying that it has to come to this.

> but I think we can never have 100% privacy because the destination IPs cannot be encrypted or hidden

This problem is solved in I2P (https://geti2p.net) by adding a few intermediate hops between you and destination. You will know someone is connecting to the network, but you can't find what they're doing.

> I know a server can host many web pages, but this requires the port, which cannot be encrypted either

You can host multiple web sites in the same port since the 1990s, using name-based virtual hosts (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_hosting#Name-based). It's rare nowadays to use a port other than 80 (for http://) or 443 (for https://) for public web sites.

yes you CAN if you wish of course. on the other hand nowadays 95% of domains on the Internet can be identified by IP[1][2]. so ISPs still have a pretty good guess what sites do you visit even without DNS or SNI data.

[1] https://blog.powerdns.com/2019/09/25/centralised-doh-is-bad-...

[2] https://blog.apnic.net/2019/08/23/what-can-you-learn-from-an...

I think there's still pretty good worth in this protocol. DNS is one of the key areas where we voluntarily give away information on every single website we're connecting to to a third party. This protocol certainly helps that--as long as the proxy and recursive resolver do not collude, neither will be able to associate the websites you're looking up with your IP.

It does have its limitations; a MITM can still just as easily see which IP addresses you connect to and determine which websites are associated with those IPs. But ODoH isn't really meant to fix that. A VPN would be better suited to fix that particular privacy concern.

The only solution is onion routing AKA Tor and similar.