Re P2: Jaynes' claim was that the laws of probability reduce to Aristotelian rules of deductive logic when the Pr=1. I do not agree that this makes logic subordinate to a mathematical process -- no more than AR's theory of concepts makes concept formation subordinate to algebra. In any case, the claim is mathematically true (given Jaynes' system which I admit may need revision) but it is also a fact that deduction is dependent on induction which is consistent. So to clarify the exact relations (without violating identity or inverting hierarchy, etc) requires AR's theory of concepts which Jaynes did not have. Moreover, to define the principles of when it is valid (without enumerating all cases) to go from Pr<1 to Pr=1 IS the problem of induction which Jaynes did not specifically address.
Re P3: Jaynes completely rejects the the counting and ratio arguments for induction. Unfortunately he flips over to the subjectivist and vague "degrees of belief" view of probability and is unable to define it (which is why he needed a theory of concepts). This failure is hardly surprising given that every field today is split on intrinsic versus subjectivist premises.
In his book, Jaynes says that Aristotelian logic is a special case of probability theory, applicable in a situation where 100% certainty is achieved. This makes all of logic subordinate to a mathematical process, and as such this modeling approach is anti-conceptual.
What I meant by "frequentist Bayesian" was the property common to both the frequentist and Bayesian approaches with respect to induction, that being the idea that certainty is in general mathematically established by counting and ratios. That may be the best way to bet sometimes, but it is a fallacy to define logical certainty as such in mathematical terms.