Kim1776
In his book, Jaynes says that Aristotelian logic is a special case of probability theory, applicable in a situation where 100% certainty is achieved. This makes all of logic subordinate to a mathematical process, and as such this modeling approach is anti-conceptual.
What I meant by "frequentist Bayesian" was the property common to both the frequentist and Bayesian approaches with respect to induction, that being the idea that certainty is in general mathematically established by counting and ratios. That may be the best way to bet sometimes, but it is a fallacy to define logical certainty as such in mathematical terms.
See David Harriman's book "The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics" for the latest on Objectivist induction theory. He explains how it is possible to form a valid generalization from a single instance under certain circumstances, something the frequentist Bayesian approach can't do.