The Japanese generals and admirals agreed to the attack on Pearl Harbour despite the admiral leading it reminding them that their own wargames showed such a scenario as leading to Japan's defeat--pretty much as what actually happened, with US industrial capacity eventually swamping Japan's war effort, even with the Southern Resource Area secured.

Humans don't reason, they rationalize.

Taking a swing at Mike Tyson in the parking lot before the match is pretty dumb, but if your alternative is facing him in the ring it's probably your best option. That was the context of Japan attacking the US at Perl Harbour[1].

The US had already effectively declared war on the US at that point from the point of view of Japan. They'd demanded an unconditional withdrawal from China.

There's some alternate history where Russia never sold Alaska and Japan military bases there. What do you think if the US had done in 1941 if Japan demanded it withdraw from the "occupied" territory West of the Mississippi and return it to native control, while amassing a fleet in Russian/Japanese Alaska?

Furthermore, maybe Japan just wanted the US withdrawn from New Mexico & Nevada[2] (post 1937 occupied territories), but left the demand delibirately ambiguous so as to suggest everything west of the Mississippi (Manchuria)[2] (search for "was later deleted").

I'm not suggesting those are morally equivalent, but merely that Japan at the time pretty much saw it that way. Manchuria was around half of the empire's territory.

So suggesting that Perl Harbor wasn't reasonable is a pretty big stretch. Unless one of your options is to effectively become a vassal state of the US (unconditionally abandon >50% of your territory) war was inevitable.

At that point they could either take the initiative at Perl Harbor, or wait until the US attacked them at its leisure.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#Diploma...

2. http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_1/56_S4.pdf

There are too many inaccuracies to address in this, but I do want to touch on your idea of Japan becoming a "vassal state of the US." This is out of touch with what Japan had been doing in China and Manchuria. Japan had invaded Manchuria (which had never been Japanese territory)in 1931. Japan had secured some rights from Imperial Russia to operate the South Manchuria Railway Zone. They leveraged this to expand their foothold in China and Manchuria; the Chinese government was too weak to really contest this and eventually the Japanese directly attacked China.

There's no way to paint the conflict in the region as justified. The Japanese were clearly seeking to expand their empire, after having tasted victory defeating Imperial Russia. Just because countries stood in their way doesn't justify their actions, and simplifying it down to fighting Mike Tyson isn't very critical thinking.

How is whether or not a state is prepared to take implied threats of war unless large and unconditional concessions are made out of touch with Japan's record in China and Manchuria?

I'm not suggesting anything about Japan's moral right to engage in those campaigns.

I'm replying to fatbird's upthread comment to the effect that a general in the Empire of Japan could realistically decide on either of "how about we let them attack first?" or "how about we just do what they're suggesting for nothing in return, and stop being such dicks to everyone?".

Which is essentially what the suggestion that the attack on Perl Harbor wasn't "rational" from the Japanese perspective amounts to.

The whole problem of how they ended up in the situation that culminated with their defeat in WWII is pretty much that no one person could steer them off the course of inevitable destruction.

So a general deciding to attack Perl Harbor is making the best and most rational decision he can make and has power to make, within a framework of decision making that amounts to steering the country into the iceberg.

I do take back that they would have become a "vassal state of the US". Vassal states get something tangible in return, the US wasn't offering anything except implied war and destruction in return for unconditional demands. I think "puppet state" or "satellite state" is a more apt description in that context.

Again, you're writing nonsense, both from a historical and logical point of view.

The Japanese military establishment in the 1930's was hellbent on expanding their influence. They had defeated Imperial Russia, and felt like it was their time in the sun. They had complete dominance over the government, and chose, yes chose to undertake a path of aggression towards their neighbors. First they started with Manchuria, and installed a puppet government. Then they moved on China.

Unsurprisingly, this provoked concern amongst other countries that had interests in the region. The Dutch (Indonesia), the British (Singapore and Malaysia), and the US (Philippines) realized the threat posed by the expanding Japanese empire. At the time the US was still in the midst of the Great Depression and was in no state to challenge Japan militarily, so they used an oil embargo to try and persuade the Japanese to adhere to international agreements.

It wasn't until 1941 that the US cut off oil to Japan. At this point, Japan had already invaded and controlled Manchuria, invaded and controlled a majority of China. When Japan seized control of Indochina, the US and allies attempted to influence Japan to leave Indochina by seizing US held assets, and embargoing oil. Japan had anticipated this and began a regional war attacking both the US, Dutch and UK territories.

You seem to imply that these things just "happen" and that no one is in control or making decisions. While history often seems to have an impetus of its own, it's the result of choices leaders and people make. Tojo and his warmongers sought out conflict in the region, dismissed counsel from wiser heads, and set Japan on a course to ruin.

Hirohito made a choice to continue to allow the militarist factions in the Japanese government to hold sway. But to point to the day the go ahead was given to Isoroku Yamamoto as the crux of the issue is to miss the point; he holds responsibility, as did the other military leaders and the Emperor. They knew the risks when they invaded Indochina; they knew the latent power of the US, but they underestimated their foes, and overestimated their own ability to wage war.

Attacking Pearl Harbor was irrational, both in hindsight, but also in terms of what the Japanese knew at the time. It was less than a year before the IJN began to experience catastrophic losses, and after Guadalcanal, there IJN was on its back foot for the rest of the war.

What could Japan have done differently? They could have restrained themselves from invading Indochina and prompting the expect oil embargo. If that wasn't feasible, they could have relinquished control of Indochina, though that would have caused a tremendous loss of face. They could have attacked and invaded the Dutch East Indies to gain oil, and odds are the US wouldn't have gotten involved. Great Britain was pretty busy with fighting Germany at the time and wouldn't have been able to help the Dutch much. If they did, the Japanese would easily defeat them in Singapore, as they did on Dec 8th.

The isolationist sentiment in the US at the time wouldn't have allowed the US to intervene. We weren't intervening in the European war, despite Lend-Lease, and sure wouldn't have intervened in Asia unless directly attacked.

> You seem to imply that these things just "happen" and that no one is in control or making decisions [...] Tojo and his warmongers sought out conflict in the region, dismissed counsel from wiser heads, and set Japan on a course to ruin [...] Hirohito made a choice to continue to allow the militarist factions in the Japanese government to hold sway.

Uh, no, I did not imply that in the least.

I think you're just on some rant against a strawman view that the Empire of Japan wasn't militaristic or an aggressor nation in Manchuria or Pearl Harbor / WWII.

I didn't suggest anything of the sort, I was merely replying to the narrow question of whether an admiral on Isoroku Yamamoto's staff could be considered irrational for going along with the Pearl Harbor attack.

I don't think that's the case for exactly the reasons you seem to agree with and are arguing for.

What options do you think an admiral who's not in a senior role has in the Empire of Japan at the time when, as you've noted, his boss's-boss's and boss's-boss's-boss's etc. are clearly in favor of that general strategy?

The idea that the Hull note was perceived as a casus belli isn't some fringe conspiracy theory. If you e.g. read the Wikipedia articles involved such as [1] and [2] they cite scholars who agree (and others who disagree) with that view.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_note#Interpretations

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_o...

You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli since the US

<demanded unconditional withdrawal from China.>

This is factually incorrect. The goal of the oil embargo was to get Japan out of Indochina, not China or Manchuria. Japan could have finessed this by installing a puppet regime (ala Manchuko), but their arrogance wouldn't allow that.

Now you move from

<a general deciding to attack Perl(sic) Harbor is making the best and most rational decision>

to

<an admiral who's not in a senior role has in the Empire of Japan>

Yamato is the architect of both the tactical plan of attacking Pearl Harbor, as well as the strategy of reducing American seapower (by attacking PH) and then defeating them in a decisive battle (Midway). He's not some lower ranking officer, he's the intellectual and martial spirit of the IJN.

This also shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the power and influence of Yamamoto. Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family. Yamamoto could have used this influence earlier, to moderate Tojo's ambitions, and to avoid conflict with the US. He knew that Japan could never defeat the US over time, but still acted irrationally in a way that failed Japan.

You're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo, and the Hull note. The oil embargo (along with other trade restrictions and confiscation of Japanese assets) began immediately in July 41 after the Japanese began to make obvious preparations to attack either the British in Malaya, or the Dutch in the East Indies.

The Hull note was a last ditch attempt in late November to forestall war. At this point, war was inevitable; the attack on Pearl Harbor had been planned since Spring of 41, and the Kido Butai had already departed before the Hull note was sent.

> You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli [...] you're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo.

Where did I mention anything about the oil embargo? You're the one who brought that up, and now you're arguing with yourself.

The historians who are of the opinion that the Hull note amounts to a declaration of war aren't talking about the aspect of it that relates to oil.

Nobody thinks a refusal to trade goods amounts to a declaration of war, rather the part where the US implicitly threatens "or else" if Japan doesn't sign on to some version of a wide ranging policy agreement it didn't find palatable.

> Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family.

It sounds like you're in agreement with my point then.

This whole thread is about the supposed irrationality of Japanese admirals subservient to Yamamoto. Not about what Yamamoto could have done.

I invite you to re-read fatbird's upthreads comment while you're looking for some place where I directly or indirectly mentioned anything about oil (I didn't), I.e.:

> "The Japanese generals and admirals agreed to the attack on Pearl Harbour despite the admiral leading it[...]"

Thank you for this assessment. If you're as versed in other historical wars as the Pacific front, I would love to hear your assessments of Operation Barbarossa, Israel's six-day war, and the Russian intervention in Krim. All conflicts are difficult to find non-biased assessments of, but those three each have nuances that that are rippling through the years and I would love to further understand them.

LOL, not that there's any shortage of history books about each of the well known, studied-to-death, events that you are asking about. Just go to any library. Notice, though, that there may be several very different views of the same event, all of them equally unbiased.

That’s literally my point. Everyone, including them, knows they’d lose and the gravy train would stop. There is no way they’d ever do a premature attack. It’s insane.

History is filled with people doing insane things.

Well the kicker is that the North Korean foreign policy is predicated on them trying to appear as insane as possible to other people, without really being actually too insane. And maybe ironically, not really an act that any sane person want to play or be a part of.

But the people involved literally don't have a choice. What do you think their alternative is? Let it be, go home, take a beer out of the fridge, lay down on the sofa, watch some football and call it a day? That's not how the life of those generals looks like.

Easy to claim what "a sane person" would do from the arrogant POV of a western average citizen, but reality looks very different.

Their defense policy is the same as the US: don't attack, else you risk slagging of your city/ies. This is the core of MAD. You don't maintain MAD by not promising you are going to shoot back.

Soviet generals were all for a war with the US at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis even though they knew they'd come off very badly. I don't think there was anything unusually irrational about them - people just do crazy things in situations like that.

Because they thought the US would nuke them first. And from what i read there we're enough crazy generals who wanted to exactly do that during the cold war.

Absolutely, a lot of people wanted a "preventative" war against the Soviet Union notably Curtis LeMay:

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/06/19/the-general-an...

I've even had people on HN arguing with me that such a war was the "rational" thing to do - which I found rather disturbing, to say the least.

The truth is that NK would never ever move a finger against the US, it wouldn't make the slightest sense.

On the other hand, it does feel threatened, and having a dangerous weapon and acting reckless keeps possible attackers at bay.

But if an all-out war between NK and the US started, it would be started by the only ones who can possibly think of winning it, that is the US.

Why NK can act only rationally, while US could choose to act irrationally? Both sides can act irrationally, as history shows.

Why would it be irrational for the US to attack (a non nuclear-ready) NK? If NK didn't have nuclear weapons, invading it would be an option for the US- as they did recently with Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. I'm not sure what the gains would be, but it's not completely irrational to start a war when you have such overwhelming military superiority.

It is 'more rational' for an American president to avoid war with NK and leave it as something for his successors to deal with. Kicking the can down the road is easier than a war where potentially a few million South Koreans get killed in the crossfire.

This is, after all, what American presidents have been doing for the past few decades.

Same reason why the Korean War ended. China wouldn’t like a US-friendly country so close to its borders. NK is a great buffer zone and a great way to keep US distracted over South Korea. If NK gets overtaken it means Korea would extend all the way to china’s borders which they would not accept.

It depends on circumstances. Right now:

1. NK is not expansionary.

2. NK has nukes. US does not want anyone to use nukes, even a little one.

3. Any attack on NK means many deaths in SK.

4. Bad press.

Also in the mid 90s during Clinton times, the level of engagement between US and NK had warmed enough that US even agreed to supply nuclear reactors to NK. If I am not wrong one of them was even actually partially installed in NK, before construction was halted abruptly by the NK nuclear test.

You should probably read about Serbia circa 1914.

That was an excuse, not a trigger for war.

War was desired by all parties - at least in the beginning. People celebrated when war started - look up archive photos and movies. Everybody thought that they'll have a nice fight, down a beer at the pub afterwards and be home by Christmas - effectively rehashing the last Prussian war 30 years before.

What nobody perceived at that time is technology changed enough to make the war catastrophic, and it took 2 world wars for that perception to sink in.

Based on that I'm actually surprised SK basically adheres to the rules.

I"m pretty sure though that a determined effort to overthrow NK by sneakier means would move the needle a lot.

E.g. making small scale incursions, or military maneuvers that 'mistakenly'cross the border by about 10 km, but now we refuse to budge.

oops we landed on this small shoreline here, but we'd like to stay.

What, You're all starving? We sent a massive peace mission backed by unarmed troops, and lots of food - win hearts and minds.

Basically play a constant game of chicken with them, call their bluff and needle the regime whilst taking chunks of territory at the same time.

It might soften the border enough and cause so much stress to the regime that it collapses by itself.

That's assuming that they are acting rationally, which is a pretty big assumption.

Yes, winning at politics requires some skill and intellect, but it doesn't mean that the winning actor is intellectual or rational.

Depend on a lot. Kim could pull a much more literal version of Nixon's Saturday Night Massacre to find someone willing to follow the orders, who knows how that would play out.

> There is no ideology or religion behind NK

You lost me here.

The ideology of the NK leadership is survival. They're not trying to spread Juche throughout the world with messianic zeal, all they want to do is stay on top of the dung heap.

Side note: Even if the leadership were True Believers (which I agree they aren't), Juche doesn't seem like the kind of ideology that could really be used to justify expansion. I understand it to be pretty ethnocentric. At most it would support unifying Korea. But I don't see it trying to expand outside "the homeland". You might see import substitution, less-open borders, restrictions on foreigners, stuff like that. If Korea had some grand historical claims I could see it going irredentist, but I don't think those claims exist.

Their ambitions are curbed by their capacity, nothing more. The initial phase of NK existence was militant expansion, arrested only with crushing military defeat.

The broad framework of Communist states at the time was establishing world dominance through force and persuasion, although they couldn't agree on the exact pace and methods. NK was in this respect not an outlier, the Kim v1 likely seeing his role in the new world order less marginal than ruling half a peninsula. In particular, anti-Japan sentiment was and still is cultivated throughout society. In 2020 it can not be ascribed to realistic self-preservation interest.

And in either case, the very fact they do have ideology means a lot. Certain decisions are going to be made not due to strategic and personal interest but to an abstract rulebook not necessarily in sync with reality. Therein lies a huge danger not covered by assumptions of rational actor model.

NK is barely surviving. They don’t have enough ammunition and fuel for a full blown war. They don’t care about religion or doctrine. They are not trying to spread communism. They have no delusions they can take the Korean Peninsula.

Without anything motivating themselves besides just trying to survive, the motivation of everyone to fight is very low. That doesn’t make for a good dedicated army. Most NK soldiers would surrender as soon as they could.