Requisite:
> The term was coined by Timothy C. May in 1988. May referred to "child pornographers, terrorists, drug dealers, etc."[2]. May used the phrase to express disdain for what he perceived as "Think of the children" argumentation by government officials and others seeking to justify limiting civilian use of cryptography tools. Connotations related to such argumentation continue to be attached to the phrase, and it is more commonly used by those who wish to deride various restrictions on Internet activity than by those who support such restrictions.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Horsemen_of_the_Infocalyp...
• By ensuring there is always an opposing power.
• By maintaining democracy, by which I mean the tenet of electing governments from the citizenry as well as by the citizenry, and specifically rather than any of the oligarchical forms.
• By maintaining the rule of law.
The consequences being, if all encryption is backdoored, then any encryption used by politicians is by definition eavesdroppable by their opponents and enemies. Since all politicians thrive in a web of mendacity and confidences, they have a strong incentive for strong encryption, and will eventually terminate/abandon legislation that weakens it.
Any politician that threatens otherwise is therefore a) grandstanding, and/or b) using the issue to leverage/negotiate something else.
Corollaries:
• Any government seriously implementing such a plan is operating as an oligarchy rather than a democracy, and will have plans to defend themselves from the surveillance imposed on the citizens.
• The first instinct of every would-be oligarch is to undermine the machinery of democracy and compromise the rule of law.
c.f. Utopia (Australia, 2014) Season 4 Episode 4 "Mission Creeps", and probably at least one Jim Hacker moment.
8. Privacy activists will leave group 6 by attrition, further reinforcing justification by authorities for 7.
Privacy only works well when everyone has it.
https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/SKM_C4582...
In my view there is a good chance that (2) will not be EU law for the foreseeable future, although this does require some opposition work. I guess one can see it as education of the politicians (the commissioners in this case).
Educate the Comissioners? The president of the Comission is an ex home secretary ie. a lady with a policing mindset just like Theresa May, only allegedly corrupt. Somehow her phones were wiped clean when required as evidence in a recent investigation. The irony of this legislation is that it could expose her own doings.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.politico.eu/article/ursula-...
The Comissioners were told to use Signal after Bezos' phone got trojaned through WhatsApp. Encryption is only good when it's for their own benefit.
As is always the case with these fights, the fundamental fact is that the war is asymmetric. We have to be right all of the time, they have to be right once. We have to break all encryption everywhere forever, they have to find one non-backdoor'd solution.
If you really hold the backdoor proponents' feet to the fire, they'll admit that yes, this is true, but at least with a backdoor you can catch some of the terrorists/child abusers/etc, some of the time (of course, you only get the dumb ones...), and we wouldn't want to let the perfect be the enemy of the good. But of course, saying you want to compromise all privacy in the developed world to catch a few dumb traffickers doesn't get votes.
You can also solve this with a webpage, this way it can be used on all devices.
The point is that creating a secure channel few users use is pretty trivial unless you outlaw crypto libraries. These laws can only take down apps/websites in mainstream use.
Even regular GPG-encrypted email using random rarely used email addresses will work quite fine.
Making an Apollo program requires a bit more than ctrl+v.
I hope that if we ever reach a steady state, it will be unbreakable privacy.
We need actual software like https://Matrix.org or https://qbix.com/platform to be good enough that people will install it. Like the Web Browser did killed AOL and MSN. Otherwise we will live with Facebook Google etc. and this is moot. But that is just the beginning.
Secondly, we need open source hardware. We are nowhere close to competing with Apple and Android. But as we have seen over the last 20 years - there is a war on general purpose computing and the closed systems have started to win. Just today I read that Android doesn’t let you take a screenshot of your own phone.
Third of all - the open distribution mechanisms you rely on today to not block you (eg web browsers) can be closed or ship updates with backdoors tomorrow to most users. Apple and Google together control most of the market. It isn’t hard to pressure them to do this.
Apple blocked blockchain dapps being distributed on iOS, unless they are made by an Apple developer whose app they can revoke. Amazon can yank your movies and books out of your hands.
Anything you think is secure (eg secure enclave) may not be. Trusted Computing Environments are made by two companies essentially.
In fact, I am surprised that more “stuxnet” attacks arent done in nuclear reactors across various countries. As self driving cars get hooked up to the net or delivery drones become ubiquitous we may see massive vulnerabilities that can be exploited all at once. Not just by state actors but anyone. Really scary stuff.
Sadly the same entities locking down the computing devices also start requiring uplinks to their servers and can push any updates. Regular people are at the mercy of corporations and the state.
Unless open source companies step up and build a decentralized hardware distribution infrastructure, with multiple actors (like VOIP relaced centralized telephone switchboard operators) all these arguments are moot. There is a handful of tech companies whose arms need to be twisted and that’s all.
PART II:
To be honest ... I no longer think that end-to-end encryption is the right solution to human rights problems. If citizens are reduced to sneaking around and denying their activities to survive, their governmental system is way past due for fixing. This is like the “good slave owners” delaying the abolition of slavery. You’re solving the wrong problem.
I believe that crypto is needed to secure decentralized byzantine fault tolerant systems like Ethereum etc. to be TRUSTED, not to hide information. Signatures, not encryption, if you will. If anything, it is the government who doesn’t want encryption to be broken (eg of copyrighted DVD content etc.) and there is an inherent contradiction since anyone who consumes unencrypted content can reshare it.
What we really need is to decentralize the personal data in many places, and use zero-knowledge proofs for attestation, but that is different than encrypting and hiding information.
Many of the common tools (both hardware & software) that common people use are at the hands of few, who can abuse the users themselves or at the request of the Government.
> To be honest ... I no longer think that end-to-end encryption is the right solution to human rights problems. If citizens are reduced to sneaking around and denying their activities to survive, their governmental system is way past due for fixing. This is like the “good slave owners” delaying the abolition of slavery. You’re solving the wrong problem.
This (clap)(clap)(clap)
Not many seemed to care to click the link in that thread. If one did one would know that it was to a bug report and a fix was even posted in the same link. Screenshots work just fine.
The bug report was for not being able to screenshot in situations when it wasn't actually disabled.
The fundamental problem that the GP is referring to and that demonstrates the loss of control over one's own devices is that it _is_ possible for apps to disable making of screenshots to begin with.
I have written a far more extensive post just now on HN that fleshes out the overall argument against focusing on encryption - please read it here and we can discuss:
1. Terrorism and trafficking of children will win the moral high ground.
2. App stores will be forced locale by locale to conform to these policies.
3. Most people will not notice or care.
4. This will be used by N-Eyes and totalitarian governments to quash dissent.
5. Meanwhile the tech crowd will create alternate app distribution mechanisms allowing those who care to communicate securely.
6. Those secure methods will be used by people with the most to lose. (e.g. the drivers of point 1)
Given this predictable series of events I see the primary question as: How do we prevent (4)? How can we make people secure by default again and make adoption easy in the face of app store capture.