During an investigation of the impact of term limits on the California the times talked with former "long term" members of both the Assembly and the Senate. In that discussion the people who had served for longer terms felt that you needed the time to understand what made a law "good" versus what made a law "bad." Examples of good and bad were things like it would not be found to be unconstitutional, or its interpretation would be clear to judges who were ruling on it. Things like that. Bad laws are ones that are ambiguous to the point of being unenforceable or are overturned at the first challenge. There was also some discussion of "wisdom" in terms of knowing what things would benefit most from change vs changing things that are easier but less durable.
They found that the time clock on legislators terms made them more eager for "easy wins" rather than tacking complex problems. This was especially true of legislators who were hoping to jump into national politics. So while a legislator had the freedom to introduce a bill to solve a tough problem many times over a long career, each time taking into account the feedback from others over how it was crafted, term limited legislators felt they could not "waste time" on something that they would not be able to see through in the amount of time remaining to them.
And while legislators have always had staffs that would help in the development and drafting of legislation, in terms of likely being able to get the legislation over the finish line, laws that came from special interests with the promise of providing "good press" to support it are seen as a better bet.
By the same token, I am not a California Legislator, nor have I been one (although I have considered putting my name in the running to develop some experiential learning there). As a result I cannot know for certain how much I read about the process is biased in a way that someone who was part of the process would easily spot.
Whether or not what I've read about the process is accurate, it is still an area that I am interested in and I find the "dual" between the legislature and initiative writers interesting in its own right.
Ah that actually makes a lot of sense to me. I did not actually consider that when you mentioned experience - a newer politician certainly has more pressure to put points on the board and it follows that they may introduce "buggy" laws.
cf new developers who are under pressure to get commits into the codebase and will end up making mistakes as a consequence.
Intuitively I feel like mistakes would be repeated on a longer time scale. So someone who remembers what we did 15 years ago would say “let’s not waste time on this, it hasn’t worked in the past”.
You can still learn with 10 year term limits but then you’re doomed to repeat the same mistakes every 10 years.
That assumes 1) that every term expires at the same time, and 2) no-one ever documents anything...
2.a) no one ever reads the documentation.
Rich individuals can act just as you’ve described. Groups of workers can get together and get bills passed specifically for their special interest to the detriment of the country as a whole. Etc.
If your political opponent can drown your message out, then it becomes an imperative for you to also raise money and/or find a wealthy benefactor to argue your own ideas. You end up with a system that the only ideas that are seriously considered are ones that can raise enough money to not be drowned out. I don't think we are there today in our current politics but I think it's worth thinking about as it's not clear to me that government will remain impervious to this type of influence.
Left wing systems also have powerful special interests.
(Note that we're talking specifically about democracy, regardless of the economic system.)
In America, at least, I do not see any significantly powerful, economically left, political structures.
Non-capitalist ones.
> And do they wield power through any other means than capitalism?
Sure. For an obvious example, see public sector unions. For another, NASA. The public school system. In the news lately are the police interests. The military. Organized religion.
They wield considerable political power via controlling large voting blocks.
Other means historically used are military power. The end of the Roman republic is an obvious example, but the historical examples are endless. (Even in the US, George Washington was offered a military dictatorship, but turned it down.)
None of these are capitalist, and all are present in non-capitalist systems. The idea that under non-capitalism there wouldn't be powerful special interests is hopelessly untrue.
Unless you somehow think these people are somehow deluded or being manipulated or simply wrong because they do not agree with your political views, the ideal of democracy must be to have as large a part of the population as possible involved in politics and voting as possible.
Simply put, if I had 100B, and there was outside force threatening my business I would certainly invest to protect myself - this includes mundane things like investing in security and outside threats like regulation. I just don't know you would design a government that is protected against an outside player pouring hundreds of millions of dollars in order to change the laws. If anything I think an official who decided to get in bed with special interest groups is far more prepared to outspend any opponent, and is the safer option for special interests groups.
I think, in the future, we will see more Facebook era startups get smarter and smarter on playing politics. Airbnb originally failed miserably in their political game, but I think as time goes on SV will only get better at influencing California & global politics.