Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
by rwmj on Sunday April 24, 2011 @04:33AM
(#2478514)
For KVM, we've implement SVirt. We don't trust the main userspace (qemu-kvm) process, and assume that it has been subverted by the guest. We contain it using SELinux rules.
http://selinuxproject.org/page/SVirt
This is now a standard feature in Fedora (since Fedora 11):
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/SVirt_Mandatory_Acces...
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
by gaius on Sunday April 24, 2011 @05:29AM
(#2478566)
The state-of-the-art on attack surfaces and VMs right now is JRockit Virtual Edition, which runs the JVM directly on the hypervisor, no OS in the middle. Which makes all kinds of sense really - what's the point of running a VM inside a VM?
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
by jamii on Sunday April 24, 2011 @06:41AM
(#2478627)
Similarly, but much less mature, Mirage runs the ocaml RTS directly on top of Xen: http://openmirage.org/
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
by aristidb on Sunday April 24, 2011 @07:44AM
(#2478705)
Or, for Haskell on Xen: http://halvm.org/wiki/
The other problem is these OS's often don't seem to get very far. Seems like Qubes is launching beta 1. It's the kind of thing that one would expect needing a significant time to shake out.
Which isn't to say I wouldn't like to run a nicely implemented example of the concept. It certainly has the possibility of raising the bar significantly. Of course, it seems like no matter how far windows raises the bar people still keep on jumping it easily.