Machine learning is linear algebra, nothing more nothing less. Making a model, using it wrong, and then complaining that "the model failed" is a unique kind of stupidity that's becoming more and more popular with "hoi polloi" due to garbage articles like this.
But mostly I agree with you: modeling is horse shit, worshipping models (linear and otherwise) is childish idolatry and Dijkstra was completely correct about just about everything (speaking as an APL bum).
Yes, I'm not disagreeing with any of that (see also my other reply), it was a misuse of terminology on my part.
> But mostly I agree with you: modeling is horse shit, worshipping models...
Absolutely. The way I see it is that models are like theorems: they are useful and worthy of being studied, but if you forget to validate that your hypotheses are correct, you get wrong results: garbage in, garbage out.
An alarming amount of stuff these days is the equivalent of people trying to apply the pythagorean theorem to a non-rectangle triangle and then complaining the results don't match.
Your computer's abilities are the result of little switches flipping between two states.
I don't think this is a reductionist view of a computer. That's exactly what it is, and with a very little imagination describes what it has the capacity to do. What computers do now wouldn't be a surprise to people in the 1940s.
Similarly, you can say that deep learning is just a series of matrix multiplications with nonlinearities applied, which is true, but it certainly wasn’t obvious to most that when you scale that way up, that that would lead to computers being able to interpret images, sound, and text. For example, my AI course professor described neural nets as something of interest mostly for historical reasons, something that was tried, but was an evolutionary dead end. And he was no slouch.
The hype has gotten ahead of its current abilities, but I simultaneously think that it will be one of the most impactful inventions we’ve ever created.
This statement is one of the things I find most fascinating about the current state of AI. Do I think deep learning is incredibly useful? Absolutely and I look forward to seeing more awesome stuff done with it in the future.
Do I think the singularity or "true" AI will be based on deep learning? Not really. I strongly suspect anything capable of reaching scifi levels of intelligence (which a lot of hype says or strongly implies is imminent) will have to be a difference of kind, not of degree.
I could be wrong, of course, but it will be interesting to wait and see.
But I'm also guessing we'll come up with an endless number of complex tweaks to get the current stuff closer before someone figures out the simple mechanics and sweeps most of that away.
Modeling is actually very very useful but is too often oversold, which drives me bananas. It's especially bad in the world of data driven or data intensive models because that's trendy and sells software, hardware, and services. The problem is that various forms of modeling are complex and therefor expensive and convincing people to invest in furthering the domain results in these poor public misrepresentations and overselling.
Modeling gives us ways to abstract reality and attempt to predict the future or find patterns we might otherwise miss. Sometimes it works, a lot of times it doesn't, but when it does it's great. Everytime--its expensive and people need to feel they didnt waste their money.
Drew McDermott, 1976, Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity https://www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/graduate/691/fall19/07/pap...
"However, to say anything good about anyone is beyond the scope of this paper." This is the best conclusion for a paper I've ever seen :D
> As a field, artificial intelligence has always been on the border of respectability, and therefore on the border of crackpottery.
This was written in 1976.
If you take the word "computer" out of the sentence this statement is likely backwards. Putting the word computer back in doesn't change that.
Look, for example, at Dennett's seminal book, "The Intentional Stance" for a philosophical discussion of the expressive and reasoning power behind statements like "The thermostat tries to keep the temperature at 60 degrees".
If you say "the classifier thinks this roadsign is a truck" everyone knows you mean "the classifier has labeled this roadsign as a probably a truck with a high confidence". No-one seriously would take you to mean the classifier thinks in the same way a person thinks any more than if you say "The toaster wants to pop up but it's jammed," they would take you to mean the toaster has a yearning like unrequited love.
If we remove our ability to use language in this way we give up on a mental model that is incredibly useful for simplifying lots of explanations and reduce ourselves to a very clumsy literalism instead. As long as we understand the limitations of this model and are clear that it's not literally what is going on it's very useful.
> "the classifier thinks this roadsign is a truck" everyone knows you mean "the classifier has labeled this roadsign as a probably a truck with a high confidence".
The fact that the classification is probabilistic is obvious to me and to you, but nothing in the natural wording suggests that, and it's a pretty important caveat.
It's not enough for us to understand the limitations of natural language, everyone in the conversation has to, for it to be a useful tool.
But all this does is underline that natural language is a vague mesh of concept categories anchored to words with multiple overloaded meanings.
One of the reasons philosophy exists is because sometimes it attempts to untangle the overloading.
The argument about AI is no different, but with the complication that the marketing concept mesh has different requirements to the research concept mesh, and both are different to "Make this work by next Tuesday" mesh.
Google used to have an ancestor of word2vec which tried - very crudely - to map some of these meshes. Predictably it was much better at mapping word meshes than concept meshes, but it was still an interesting approach.
The underlying problem is that we literally don't have a clear representation system for these concept meshes. Words are overloaded, code and math are too specific in their different ways. The various shades of ML are still too concrete.
So we're going to keep having these debates until someone invents a representation system for natural language concept maps that isn't based on verbal approximations.
ML is a commodity now, even popular with artists to create art. Being a commodity means you dont have to understand the inner workings to benefit from it. I don't see anything wrong with that, but a lack of proof for biases/backdoors/bugs in models is an issue that I'm worried about when its applied too enthusiastically in critical areas.
Article is weak though, and hard to follow conclusion.
I haven't run into the phrase anywhere else, and Google doesn't turn up any programming-related results that I can tell, but I've found the idea endlessly useful. In talking about programs and the goal of programs, we often use language that describes things we have not yet been able to construct. The language has a parasitic relationship to the thing it names - misdirecting our understanding of the machine it sits on.
I try to practice a lot of skepticism around language and computers. It is very easy to name a thing and much harder to make the machine behave in the way the language suggests.
Especially the trend of "misuse of language, e.g., by choosing terms of art with colloquial connotations or by overloading established technical terms"
Similarly in OOP, you could technically name getters in any way you want, but why would you not conform to the accepted "getValue()" standard?
Of course fooling yourself into thinking you have achieved things you actually haven't by clever usage of natural language is the opposite end of the spectrum, and it's exactly what I was ranting against.
I guess "skepticism" is the correct word, indeed.
Neural nets are non-linear. If they were linear, that would be linear regression.
I actually don't get what your point is.
Attaching (meta)physical meanings ("neurons", "intelligence") to any of that is dubious at best.
In other words, we cannot pinpoint the exact sequence of operations and events that produce a certain behavior, while we absolutely can do that with ML models (you could in principle run machine learning models with pen and paper, obviously).
If you could show me a program that emulates my brain to a certain degree of precision (it's unlikely that such a program would be a deterministic one, by the way), I would have no problem accepting that my brain is not meaningfully different from that program.
The definition of words changes in response to increasing knowledge - just take 'energy' for example. One cannot establish truths about the world by arguments from usage. (On the other hand, to be clear, I do not think that the current state of AI merits being called "intelligence". What happens in the future is speculation.)
> What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not x86 machine code.
The introduction of x86 machine code at this point seems to be moving away from your original claims about "AI" being "just" relatively simple (though not simply linear) mathematical models, which are not "just" machine code either. The interesting (and very much open) question is how much of intelligence can be modeled in this way, and what else, if anything, is necessary.
The more you stress the simplicity of these models, the more intriguing their achievements seem.
The usual process in mathematics and science is that you have a phenomenon that everyone agree exists but nobody can quite put their finger on it, so someone proposes a formal definition and if that definition turns out to be adequate, people work on the formal definition, and that's much easier because you now can use math, statistics, formal methods, etc; a prime example of this is the notion of "computability".
I don't believe that we are seeing the same thing with the concept of "intelligence", this is probably in part because it's much harder to capture the concept in a formal definition. Computers do computable stuff. Overlapping that notion with "intelligence" serves no purpose in my opinion: it explains nothing, it doesn't clarify anything, and it's certainly not obvious that the two are related.
> which are not "just" machine code either
I'm using "machine code" as proxy for "instructions/lambdas/whatever for a computational model of your choice", which they certainly are.
> The more you stress the simplicity of these models, the more intriguing their achievements seem.
It's not my intention to downplay any of the achievements of "AI". They are certainly not less intriguing when viewed from my perspective, the same way a compiler is not less intriguing if you think it's "just code".
My point is that any association of a formal concept (math, models, etc.) with philosophical concepts (intelligence, "truths about the world", consciousness, etc.) is always on thin ice, because natural language and formal concepts are hard to mix. Especially so when the concepts at play are so ephemeral.
Would you say that's one part of your point? Just to clarify, I am only responding to that part of your point.
By way of example, behaviorists declared a strict subset of the human experience to be in the purview of scientific study--and that may even have been just fine for that era.
You seem to be sweeping something important under the rug because it's hard to pin down, and saying that this is what science has done in the past--and if so, you're right.
But there's an assumption--an assumption that it is safe to sweep things under the rug like that. That assumption may prove false, and if it does, we're screwed.
Convinced that AGI is not something to worry about? Fine--but surely you agree there's such a thing as an information hazard? That is, information that can be deadly in the wrong hands: like how to create the next COVID, or how to make a nuclear bomb. In past eras of human history, knowledge was not as powerful. Today and ever more so in the future, whether humanity can Get Things Right will matter.
So from my perspective, it doesn't matter that whatever 'intelligence' is, is hard to pin down: it's still got to be figured out, whether or not it's difficult.
Yes, that's part of the point, your wording is better than mine. If we're sticking to a purely historical perspective, this is definitely what happened. Most disciplines that today we (rightfully) regard as fully independent, originally splintered off philosophy (the most obvious examples are mathematics and physics, but even something like economics, in spite of having become more formalized recently, undoubtedly originates from moral philosophy).
> You seem to be sweeping something important under the rug because it's hard to pin down, and saying that this is what science has done in the past--and if so, you're right.
I won't deny that strictly speaking there is a bit of inductivism at play here. Historically, the scientific approach of limiting the domain of discourse to a tractable subset has been so much more productive and successful than any alternative that my, as it were, "bayesian prior", is that we should replicate the same approach if possible at all.
> So from my perspective, it doesn't matter that whatever 'intelligence' is, is hard to pin down: it's still got to be figured out, whether or not it's difficult.
This is a reasonable position, but wouldn't you agree that it's more of a "moral intuition" (not that there's anything wrong with that!) than a position regarding how ML results ought to be interpreted? As such I have no real counterpoints to offer, except perhaps an utilitarian point of view: are you really sure that banging your head against this very specific wall is the most productive thing to do?
Most problems I see with AI arise from either flat out using the models incorrectly (i.e. mathematically wrong, not ethically wrong, which is what I was pointing out in my previous comments) or from already familiar "political" problems, i.e. incentives, transparency, privacy, openness of the decision-making process.
The good news is that none of that is new. The bad news is that our track record as a species on problems of that kind is abysmal. I doubt that, in any case, trying to halt scientific progress makes sense.
Nevertheless, I agree that in the specific case of current AI, using the word "intelligence" is misleading. I do not, however, think this misuse has any serious consequences, as, to reverse how I put it before, usage does not establish truths about the world.
>> which are not "just" machine code either
> I'm using "machine code" as proxy for "instructions/lambdas/whatever for a computational model of your choice", which they certainly are.
Then that is an unfortunate choice of proxy, unless, perhaps, you intended to imply that it is a priori impossible for intelligence to be created by running x86 machine code. It was not clear to me whether, by introducing machine code into the discussion, you were not making some sort of argument from incredulity against the possibility of AI.
> My point is that any association of a formal concept (math, models, etc.) with philosophical concepts (intelligence, "truths about the world", consciousness, etc.) is always on thin ice, because natural language and formal concepts are hard to mix. Especially so when the concepts at play are so ephemeral.
At least since Newton, mathematical models have proved very useful in discerning truths about the world. Are we to just assume they will not work for the biological phenomena of intelligence and consciousness?
I'm afraid I failed to understand your point, then. I don't have a problem with what you said there.
> using the word "intelligence" is misleading. I do not, however, think this misuse has any serious consequences
This is where I fundamentally differ. Its misuse implies a connection between a formal model (algorithm expressed in a computational model) and a philosophical concept (intelligence) that's dubious at best. On a conceptual level, this makes it harder to reason clearly about those fundamentally mathematical and abstract concepts, and on a concrete level, it misleads the public at large, implying that certain goals have been reached when that's plainly untrue. That's pretty "serious" in my book.
> Then that is an unfortunate choice of proxy, unless, perhaps, you intended to imply that it is a priori impossible for intelligence to be created by running x86 machine code.
Again, I'm afraid I don't understand your objection. It's widely accepted that all reasonable computational models are equivalent. Citing x86 was colorful language, it has clearly no bearing on the point at large. Machine Learning algorithms are clearly computable, which means they are expressible as Turing machines, terms of a classical untyped lambda calculus, Python scripts, C++ template metaprograms, or anything else. They are literally just programs.
> At least since Newton, mathematical models have proved very useful in discerning "truths about the world." Are we to just assume they will not work for the biological phenomena of intelligence and consciousness?
I certainly believe mathematical models to be useful, you would be hard pressed to say otherwise. The ontological status of scientific theories is however at the very least a debatable topic. One needs not believe Newtonian mechanics is ontologically true, it's a tenable position to claim it's just a model, and we accept that model because it's useful.
Specifically, one could easily argue that Newtonian mechanics is false, because, for example, it fails to accurately predict Mercury's orbit.
Similarly, one needs not believe ML is anything more than relatively simple math to find it useful.
You have to go back a couple of posts to see the point. There, you wrote "'Intelligence' is a word that, etymologically and semantically, is related to human or human-like capabilities. You wouldn't say that a leaf floating on a lake is swimming." As we are now agreed that definitions follow from knowledge and are modified in response to new knowledge, it would not be somehow wrong to extend the concept of intelligence to a certain class of machines, if it turns out to be useful and informative to do so.
> They are literally just programs.
I take it, then, that you don't agree with the sort-of Platonist view that algorithms have an existence independently of any implementation? I'm on the fence, myself, but lean towards the Platonist side.
Regardless, it follows from your position here that your original statement "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not x86 machine code" can be rewritten as "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not computable." - but while the former is true, the status of the latter is not yet decided, so they are not identical propositions.
> One needs not believe Newtonian mechanics is ontologically true, it's a tenable position to claim it's just a model, and we accept that model because it's useful.
One could say the same about specific ontologies - they are as subject to revision in the face of increasing knowledge as are both mathematical models and individual words - and if it turns out that a mathematical model of biological intelligence or consciousness is effective and useful, it would be tendentious to imagine an ontological line between that model and intelligence.
No objections, but it's a pretty big "if". You could restate my point as "there is no evidence it is in fact useful".
> I take it, then, that you don't agree with the sort-of Platonist view that algorithms have an existence independently of any implementation? I'm on the fence, myself, but lean towards the Platonist side.
I don't, my position is essentially formalist. While I believe most research mathematicians would side with me here, your position is absolutely valid; famously, Kurt Godel was a Platonist, as are many others. My only observation here is that even from a Platonist point of view you are not really rejecting formalism, at least in the sense that while you don't agree it's the only view, I find it impossible to argue that one can't view mathematical objects as formal constructs.
> "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not computable." - but while the former is true, the status of the latter is not yet decided, so they are not identical propositions.
No, I don't really hold that view. I probably worded that badly. My position is that the latter is unknown, and I would be content to accept that my brain is not fundamentally different than an algorithm if you showed me an algorithm that can effectively emulate my brain within an acceptable margin of error. Ironically, if it were possible to do that, it would be proof there is no "intelligence", only "computability", making the first entirely redundant.
> One could say the same about specific ontologies -
Again, this is really thin ice. I don't really know what to think about this because it's getting too abstract for my monkey brain, but it's certainly not obvious that a better model implies an ontological line between itself and reality. To put it bluntly, is a better model really "more true", i.e. qualitatively different from a worse one?
I'll take the seventh.
I'm not an expert in neurosciences so I can only give an informal description. Let's also remove "me" from the equation, let's talk about a randomly chosen human H. We know for a fact that there is nothing physically special about human brains, they are just ordinary organic matter. This matter forms a system subject to the laws of physics. With enough computational power and scientific knowledge (we have neither as of now, AFAIK), we could write a program for a quantum Turing machine that runs a 1:1 simulation of H's brain in software. Any quantum program can be emulated by a Turing machine equipped with sufficient random numbers with at most an exponential slowdown, making this program computable in exactly the classical sense.
My questions are (1) is it possible, even in principle, to make a program of this kind? (2) Would such a program be sufficiently predictive (with any statistical notion of that concept you prefer) of H's behavior?
If there exists a program that satisfies both (1) and (2), then I'm content with the notion that I am, myself, not significantly different from such a program.
The thing is, you can only define predictive accuracy relative to some experimental design. Otherwise you can always claim that there is some unknown, unperformed experiment where the predictions of the model and your actual behaviour would diverge to a greater degree than is permissible by your accuracy threshold, no matter how many successful experiments have already been done in constrained conditions.
Imagine a task where you have to classify images as being of dogs or non-dogs. We can already train a model that can almost perfectly predict the choices you would make during the runs of such an experiment. But we obviously wouldn't call such a model a "model of your brain"!
My question is this: what would be a sufficient experimental design or empirical criterion to decide that some program is a model of you? The loosest criterion I could imagine would be something like "can successfully deceive your loved ones into believing they are you in a single text chat of unbounded duration with some extremely high success rate." Recent advances in NLP lead me to believe that we'll be able to reach at least this level of fidelity quite soon.
And if you had originally stated your point that way, I would probably pointed out that there is equally no evidence that it will not be useful, if it turns out to be the case.
> ...but it's certainly not obvious that a better model implies an ontological line between itself and reality.
Clearly, I failed to get my point across, to the point where I cannot guess where this question is coming from. Let's see if I can be clearer...
My position on the definitions of words is that they are contingent on our knowledge and that new knowledge can change our definitions (I gave 'energy' as an example, and you appear to have accepted this point a couple of posts back.)
I take the same view of ontologies; the categories we see are contingent on what we know and may change as our knowledge increases. This should not be surprising, given that ontologies are specific cases of words with meanings that nominally pertain to how the world is. There is no implication here that a better model implies an ontological line between itself and reality; rather, the point here is effectively a "so what" reply to your statement, "it's a tenable position to claim [Newtonian mechanics] is just a model, and we accept that model because it's useful." Mutatis mutandis, as they say, and consequently, there is no justification for holding on to old ontologies if new facts suggest a better alternative, any more than there is for models or theories.
> To put it bluntly, is a better model really "more true", i.e. qualitatively different from a worse one?
Did you mean to write that, especially given that, in your previous post, you offered an argument for the proposition that "Newtonian mechanics is false, because, for example, it fails to accurately predict Mercury's orbit." If there is a relevant point here, I think it is that "more true" models are qualitatively better (and quantitatively better, also.)
> Ironically, if it were possible to [show an algorithm that can effectively emulate your brain within an acceptable margin of error], it would be proof there is no "intelligence", only "computability", making the first entirely redundant.
How so? If "intelligence" is a useful concept now (and your objection to "artificial intelligence" seems to be predicated on it being so), when we do not know if the mind is computationally modelable, why would this usefulness necessarily vanish if this turns out to be the case?
> I'll take the seventh.
? - I'm not familiar with this expression.
No objections, but isn't it a bit weird to argue that we should do that just in case it might be useful someday? We'll deal with it when it comes up.
> Clearly, I failed to get my point across
I'm sorry, I'm pretty sure there's an argument but I just don't get it. I'm not really following the train of thought anymore.
>> I'll take the seventh. >? - I'm not familiar with this expression.
Play on words: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tractatus_Logico-Philosophicus
That is not an argument that we should do that just in case it might be useful someday, it is just a response to the quoted statement. As you know, I am not in favor of the current usage of "intelligence" in AI, and the only thing we differ on in that regard is whether it matters much.
> I'm sorry, I'm pretty sure there's an argument but I just don't get it.
It is an argument that ontologies are not privileged, canonical or fixed ways of representing the world; they have to conform to current knowledge as it evolves, or be replaced, and they are only interesting if they can "earn their keep" by being useful. Consequently, I do not think your argument from ontology, that this abusage of "intelligence" is a big deal, is definitive.
So AI is the part of computing we don't know how to do yet as in the joke :) ?
Refusing the general AI hype bullshit and over-simplifying the hard foundations are quite different things, IMO.
I do, there is a difference between an universal approximator and intelligence.
But I share the objection. And there are more parts, like graph theory, calculus, statistics or more advanced stochastic approaches.
[1] https://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions/EWD05xx/E...
[2] https://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions/EWD09xx/E...
Unless you are doing academic research.
> "AI" is best understood as a political and social ideology rather than as a basket of algorithms. The core of the ideology is that a suite of technologies, designed by a small technical elite, can and should become autonomous from and eventually replace, rather than complement, not just individual humans but much of humanity.
On economical and social damage: The article mentions that less than 10 percent of the US workforce is counted as employed by the technology sector, that essential contributions of others aren't counted as "work" or compensated, that this has "hollowed out" the economy and contributed to the concentration of wealth in an elite, and that this has contributed to concentrating power, as well.
On mutual exclusivity: The article proposes paying people for contributions, rather than writing them off as non-work. It also mentions humans with "AI resources" outperforming AI alone.
I think this point was implied here: "A clear alternative to “AI” is to focus on the people present in the system. If a program is able to distinguish cats from dogs, don’t talk about how a machine is learning to see. Instead talk about how people contributed examples in order to define the visual qualities distinguishing “cats” from “dogs” in a rigorous way for the first time. There's always a second way to conceive of any situation in which AI is purported. "
It's basically like saying it's all really just "curve-fitting", a mathematical tool which which requires smart mathematicians and programmers to implement successfully, not anything genuinely intelligent about the software.
I feel like I'm talking to a college sophomore who has learned that framing and jargon are useful rhetorical tools, but hasn't learned that they serve useful purposes.
Very simple. If we contextual ever the contribution of the people, then why if it that Google captures most of the value of search ads, rather than the people who created the web pages that Google scraped? Why don’t they get a greater say in Google’s comment policies and ranking biases, including influencing which algorithms are appropriate for which context?
There were a number of websites which relied on humans (like old yahoo catalog and opendmoz). They still exist (I think), but humans did not choose them.
There is a whole bunch of other search engines other than Google, and I am sure some of them give way more control to creators. Humans did not choose them either -- likely because other humans filled them with spam and SEO.
It is all about humans -- they are the real decisive force because they get to choose if AI lives or dies.
(That said, as a part of this "decisive force", I feel modern Google products have way too many ads, and that current developments are against my interest. I guess this does show that as long as your software is great, you can charge great price, in $$$ or in attention to ads)
Wouldn't we also need to weight the human work and labor that went into all that scraping, organizing, and making Google possible? Wouldn't we need to consider the humanity of the person making the query, who may not want what the human who controls a given website that was scraped by the humans at Google wants?
Because today, Google’s search algorithm is assumed to have maximum value among the pieces, and Google gets to capture far more value than the people who generate the training data for search.
> Wouldn't we need to consider the humanity of the person making the query, who may not want what the human who controls a given website that was scraped by the humans at Google wants?
Oh, absolutely! The point is that would further lower the weight/importance/power we ought to allocate to Google’s algorithms. Again, prioritizing the human roles & needs, rather than fetishizing the “AI”.
But I see it more as using accurate descriptions rather than just alternatives, which does have value in not misleading people.
I have spoken to people who are adamant that AI is racist and needs to be forced to change, but seem at a loss to go into even layman levels of technical details.
So I suspect that they are just parroting a received opinion.
To be clear, of course I know that there are all sorts of systematic forms of unfairness. But I think that AI is just an implementation of systems.
The AI umbrella extends as far as what are essentially spreadsheets. Are spreadsheets unfair, or are the policies unfair? Does it make sense to lobby Microsoft to do something about predatory lenders using Excel?
The authors propose "focusing on the human" as an alternative but the two aren't mutually exclusive at all
Yes, it's rather vague.
What seems to be annoying the original author is simple. Most of the areas where machine learning is currently deployed are somewhat obnoxious. Ad targeting. Face recognition. Behavior recognition. Those are areas where some error is expected, so mediocre ML performance is acceptable. ML isn't yet good enough to drive, for example. That has a lower tolerance for errors.
All this is "focusing on the human". In the sense of "Big Brother is Watching You". Be careful of what you ask for.
The damage done is obvious. We discount human agency and human labor in the face of this idea. Products are being sold based on this idea. Foreign and domestic policy, security and privacy, and private and public funding are being redirected by this idea.
If one were to simply replace "AI" with "machine learning", which is the name of the actual technology in most of these cases, in most of these contexts the hype and ideology would go away. And with it take away the attention and the money. We would then be able to focus on better things.
Even if we just talked about large-scale high-performance statistical data processing, or "algorithmic automation" (AA) it would still be used everywhere, it would just be more difficult for laypeople to come to grips with it.
It's a bit as if people around 2000 were saying it's stupid to talk about "cyberspace", it's not some new space out there, it's just people sitting behind their computers connected by wires! But that term was not the reason for the hype.
Now, sure the label AI does contribute its share to the hype, but this stuff is so good that whatever way you call it (as long as it's not too many syllables), it will become a buzzword just for that reason. It's like euphemism treadmills. You can rename the concept, but it will re-acquire the same meanings. I mean "convolutional" managed to become quite a buzzword itself (even though it's a well defined technical term), as it appeared so often alongside really sexy stories.
the holy grail of AI, it's ultimate goal, is AGI, which is quite opposite of human focus.
I don't think it is an explicit goal for many people - most people seem to be focusing on using 'AI' techniques to solve narrowly defined practical problems that were difficult or impossible with other techniques.
Edit: AGI was perhaps more of an explicit goal during the phase of "good old fashioned" symbolic AI the peaked in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Philosophically AGI is ancient and has always been about humans.
"The core of the ideology is that a suite of technologies, designed by a small technical elite, can and should become autonomous from and eventually replace, rather than complement, not just individual humans but much of humanity."
>“AI” is best understood as a political and social ideology rather than as a basket of algorithms. The core of the ideology is that a suite of technologies, designed by a small technical elite, can and should become autonomous from and eventually replace, rather than complement, not just individual humans but much of humanity. Given that any such replacement is a mirage, this ideology has strong resonances with other historical ideologies, such as technocracy and central-planning-based forms of socialism, which viewed as desirable or inevitable the replacement of most human judgement/agency with systems created by a small technical elite. It is thus not all that surprising that the Chinese Communist Party would find AI to be a welcome technological formulation of its own ideology.
- there is no explanation of what the "AI philosophy" or "AI way of thinking" is according to the authors
- according to the authors this undefined philosophy has caused economical and social damage
- the authors propose "focusing on the human" as an alternative but the two aren't mutually exclusive at all
It's just a cheap formula - keep the target vague, blame the vague target for real problems without proving causation, propose an alternative that's good on its own but doesn't contradict any real form of the vaguely defined target.
I haven't read a lot of Wired but this just comes accross as poorly thought out at best. Or worse, it's just manipulative.