Trusting companies to, for example, only give access to our data when forced to by law just doesn't cut it anymore, for a lot of people. Not when companies collectively have a very poor track record in this regard, and not when the law continues to be murky and dynamic (and abused).
It's the abused dog effect: even if you, personally, treat a previously abused dog really well and swear up and down that you will never hurt it, if you raise your hand around it, it'll cower.
Since technical solutions exist for this problem, Dropbox's reasoning gets a bit thinner.
> If they're going to supply access via the website, or allow you to share with others then they need to be able to decrypt the file.
Not necessarily. For example, a key derivation function could be used to transform a password into a key, and that password could be required for users that want that kind of thing. As far as website access goes, I'm about to commit a terrible security crime here and suggest that the key derivation function could also be run in the browser. This would prevent direct access to your data by anybody at Dropbox, at least until the next time you log in, at which point they could serve up some malicious code that would record your password and ship it off to them. There are workarounds for that, too, though.
They need to be able to decrypt the file right then to give you access via the website. They don't need to be able to decrypt the file the rest of the time. If the encryption key depends on your password, this is easy to implement. In modern browsers, this could actually be done in the browser, so that the keys for decrypting the file never reach their servers.
To allow you to share individual files with others, they could encrypt each file with a randomly-generated session key, which is encrypted with your user key. When you give access to the file to a recipient, you would be encrypting a copy of that session key with the recipient's public key.
In actual fact, it appears that anyone who knows the secure hash of the file's content is able to discover that Dropbox is storing it: http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/04/how-dropbox-sacrifices-u... — and there's at least well-founded speculation, if not proof, that this means that knowing the secure hash is sufficient to read the file: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2440074
For their previous statements to be true — that their employees have no access to your files — they would have to be doing something like this.
And also that you losing your password is apocalyptically bad.
It's understandable that they chose a less-secure system design. It's not understandable that they chose to lie to their customers about it.
I never assumed that it was impossible for them to get access to my files. I just assumed that only certain people had access to the keys, and they only gave them out to third parties when forced to by law.