Anyone could have said similar things about computers in 1953, and been just as correct.
Are nuclear reactors computers? Of course not, and neither have practical reactors kept pace in development with practical computers.
But neither is it inevitable that steady progress cannot grind down the latter set of characteristics into the former. Indeed, that's what I would bet on, and I think the Admiral would be disappointed in the progress we have(n't) made.
Many people could say similar things about software in 2020 and be just as correct. :) The good Admiral may be describing some timeless aspects of engineering, possibly related to the recently discussed observation that reality has a surprising amount of detail: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16184255 .
Though, as you say, over time engineering can grind out some of the practical into practice.
For fusion, you need to achieve a high temperature. So "thermal insulation" of the centre of the plasma from the edge of the plasma is really important. The nice thing is, that since charged particles move along magnetic field lines, and magnetic field lines never cross each other, the thermal insulation of plasma made from charged particles is enormous. That would imply it is really easy to achieve really high temperatures.
However, in 1953 they overestimated the enormous "thermal insulation" at higher temperatures by 10 orders of magnitude. That is a ratio of 1e10 between the expected and the actual value. It is still enormous, mind you, but not that enormous.
If that estimation had been correct, we would have had fusion by 1973. However, in that period it gradually became clear that fusion that way was not going to happen as people found lower and lower thermal insulations in their plasmas.
The same thing might have happened with semiconductors. What if the thermal noise were off by 10 orders of magnitude at smaller scales, compared to what was expected in 1953? Computing would not be where it is today, although it would definitely still be a good possibility if we were only pushing harder in circumventing the noise.
Vaporware is a real problem in every discipline.
1. It is simple: no, nobody says here that fusion is simple.
2. It is small: well, this one is small compared to ITER, but nobody's saying it's small in an absolute sense.
3. It is cheap: sure, compared to the billions and billions poured into ITER, this is dirt, dirt cheap, but still, they have secured $200MM so far, and they will need more money until they build an actual reactor.
4. It is light: really not applicable here, since nobody's thinking of putting these reactors in submarines (which is what Rickover was really talking about).
5. It can be built very quickly: sure, the time horizon is less than the perpetual 30 years of the old fusion reactor proposals, but it's not going to be "very quick",
6. It is very flexible in purpose: no, for the time being, something that just works is fine, nobody cares about flexibility,
7. Very little development is required, it will use mostly off-the-shelf components: nope, there will be plenty of very custom made components developed for just this purpose, and lots and lots of development are required.
8. The reactor is in the study phase. it is not being built now: it is both in the study phase and being built.
In the end, what was Rickover's agenda: some people were competing with him for government funding for nuclear reactor R&D in general, and for naval nuclear reactors in particular. All those people were a nuisance to him, he had to go and plead for funds again and again, so he decided to write this letter to put this thing to rest once and for all. He managed.
But here it's fusion. Commonwealth Fusion is privately funded, they are not looking for government funding, and they are not making inflated representations to the public. They are actually keeping a low profile in general. The message of this article is simply "this time there is a glint of hope", nothing more.
First, the context. Rickover needed to get a reactor designed, series built, and operated right away. In that context, he was absolutely right.
Second, the PWR design works and it works very well for submarines. I don't know that there has been a better design concept for submarines (the USSR built a few liquid metal cooled reactors which caused them lots of problems). When you have a basic design that does work, then going ahead and building it is the right thing to do.
We can see the consequences of what that approach does to earlier stage research programmes as well because some of Rickover's people were put in charge of Argonne's reactor research programme which they did not understand and where they caused an immense amount of trouble by trying to duplicate this approach in a context where the basic approach had not been definitively decided. This lead, for instance, to spending an enormous amount of money and time pursuing an oxide fuel fast reactor concept despite being warned that there were fundamental problems with that design and that spending more time up front on metal fuel design work would be a better idea. They didn't want to hear it - oxide fuel works (which it does - in thermal PWR and BWR reactors) - so go with that and just build it.
Rickover was right of course about the principle of understanding technological predictions in the context of what we would now call Technological Readiness Levels and optimism bias but in understanding this we also have to keep in mind the other side of the coin which is not to entirely commit to premature optimisation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyman_G._Rickover#Safety_recor...
> (3) It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem.
The design has molten fluoride salt circulating in a strong magnetic field. Molten salts, unlike molten metals, have low (but not zero) conductivity.
But the motion will still induce a voltage drop across the salt. If the walls are metal, there is the possibility of galvanic corrosion due to this potential. And there's the possibility that radiation could enhance this corrosion.
Important decisions about the future development of atomic power must frequently be made by people who do not necessarily have an intimate knowledge of the technical aspects of reactors. These people are, nonetheless, interested in what a reactor plant will do, how much it will cost, how long it will take to build and how long and how well it will operate. When they attempt to learn these things, they become aware of confusion existing in the reactor business. There appears to be unresolved conflict on almost every issue that arises.
I believe that this confusion stems from a failure to distinguish between the academic and the practical. These apparent conflicts can usually be explained only when the various aspects of the issue are resolved into their academic and practical components. To aid in this resolution, it is possible to define in a general way those characteristics which distinguish the one from the other.
An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose ("omnibus reactor"). (7) Very little development is required. It will use mostly “off-the-shelf” components. (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now.
On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated.
The tools of the academic-reactor designer are a piece of paper and a pencil with an eraser. If a mistake is made, it can always be erased and changed. If the practical-reactor designer errs, he wears the mistake around his neck; it cannot be erased. Everyone can see it.