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Re:Dropbox Lack of Security by kwis on Tuesday April 19, 2011 @01:55AM (#2461768)
Tarsnap provides exactly the sort of service you're referring to, where they only store encrypted data and don't have a copy of the key.

I'm a big fan of that architecture, if only because it greatly reduces the payoff of a successful attack. When everything is stored unencrypted (or with a common master key), there's an absolutely massive payoff for the hacker who breaches the security.

Re:Dropbox Lack of Security by shin_lao on Tuesday April 19, 2011 @02:08AM (#2461802)
Tarsnap is great and its author knows what he's doing but dropbox is many UA ahead in terms of useability and platform interoperability.

Dropbox is incredibly easy to use, that's where its power comes from. It's "secure enough" for casual use.

Additionally I believe you can't share data between users with tarsnap.

There is a market opportunity for a corporate-level secure data exchange infrastructure.

Re:Dropbox Lack of Security by w1ntermute on Tuesday April 19, 2011 @10:29AM (#2462688)
> dropbox is many UA ahead in terms of useability and platform interoperability

That's besides the point. Tarsnap is more than useable enough for its target audience, which is why cperciva (rightfully) doesn't give a rat's ass about making it as user-friendly as Dropbox and its ilk.

The two issues are completely separate. Implementation of client-side encryption and user-friendliness are not mutually exclusive. Tarsnap is simply proof that client-side encryption is entirely within the realm of possibility for cloud-based data storage services.

Re:Dropbox Lack of Security by fluidcruft on Tuesday April 19, 2011 @12:58PM (#2463223)
Dropbox+ecryptfs is pretty usable, too.
Re:Dropbox Lack of Security by randombit on Tuesday April 19, 2011 @08:27AM (#2462386)
Tahoe-LAFS provides a storage service that is encrypted by the client, but the original uploader of the data is still able to delegate read-only or read-write access to others on a per-file or per-directory basis.

The overall design, including how it is possible to do secure delegation, is fairly well described in a paper from the 'Storage Security and Survivability 2008' workshop - http://tahoe-lafs.org/~zooko/lafs.pdf