Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ...
by jolux on Thursday September 17, 2020 @11:51PM
(#24512807)
>Of course it would be trivial for a hop in the delivery path to subvert that and remove the request, and all hops in delivery would still have message content access; but if people like it, a large majority of servers might support it in 5-10 years.
You're describing TLS, and this is already happening.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ...
by toast0 on Friday September 18, 2020 @12:30AM
(#24513018)
Not just TLS, but a way to say, while composing a message, if it's
can not be delivered via TLS with a valid certiticate, then don't deliver it. Which apparently already exists as REQUIRETLS https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8689.html
Published November 2019. I didn't see any data on support, and hadn't heard of it before looking just now.
Not really, the old clients would never send (or receive) end to end encrypted messages, so they don't need new UI to tell you that. That's the cost of unbounded backwards comptability.
If you want to have 100% coverage of email users, changing all clients is part of the deal. But, uhhh, good luck with that. Server based standards are an easier lift --- you could build a standard to require hop to hop encryption on mail and expect that to plausibly gain enough adoption to use over a managable time frame. Of course it would be trivial for a hop in the delivery path to subvert that and remove the request, and all hops in delivery would still have message content access; but if people like it, a large majority of servers might support it in 5-10 years.