1. At least until recent, Microsoft implemented it as blocking code in the UI thread – open a message and Outlook won't paint until it can verify the cert, access your local key store (hope your token is in a USB port which is 100% reliable), etc. If you thought “Does that mean that revocation checks block the UI until a network process completes?” you're sadly right.
2. Adoption hasn't been enough to be able to ban untrusted senders. This could still be quite useful for, say, a hard requirement that *@example.com must have signatures but it doesn't help with really common phishing tactics like pretending to be a vendor, business partner, etc.
3. You definitely need to get serious about key management because your ability to read your old encrypted email depends on retaining those keys. This is obviously not impossible but it has a cost when you think about the need to store them securely in a manner which can be restored after the inevitable system failures and compromises.
Preventing forgery of @example.com is nice, but sadly doesn't matter that much, because a message fro "Your Boss" <[email protected]> is just going to show up as Your Boss in the UI with most clients these days, amd Enterprise oriented clients are worse than the norm. The fastest way to see the actual addresses is to just press reply, which is irritating.
From: "John Q Boss"
Subject: "the blog is down"
Can you check <a href="http://0-dayfuntimes.example.org">http://blog.example.com</a>
Of course, that came in on my phone, as I was leaving for the day, and phone doesn't show email address or link destination. :(Yikes. I should probably be surprised, but I guess I'm not. This sort of thing goes a long ways towards explaining all sorts of other oddities or using Outlook.
They seem to be extremely hesitant to change it, which I assume is due to the corporate plugin ecosystem.
It's a much better user experience, and honestly I'm surprised that no enterprise orgs have adopted it, because it would probably be cheaper than all this phishing training.