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Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by epistasis on Thursday September 17, 2020 @06:38PM (#24510823)
S/MIME is the closest to dead simple solution, but it requires trusting certificate authorities.

It's a much better user experience, and honestly I'm surprised that no enterprise orgs have adopted it, because it would probably be cheaper than all this phishing training.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by acdha on Thursday September 17, 2020 @06:49PM (#24510902)
Enterprises, at least in the form of the U.S. federal government, have but there are two key drawbacks:

1. At least until recent, Microsoft implemented it as blocking code in the UI thread – open a message and Outlook won't paint until it can verify the cert, access your local key store (hope your token is in a USB port which is 100% reliable), etc. If you thought “Does that mean that revocation checks block the UI until a network process completes?” you're sadly right.

2. Adoption hasn't been enough to be able to ban untrusted senders. This could still be quite useful for, say, a hard requirement that *@example.com must have signatures but it doesn't help with really common phishing tactics like pretending to be a vendor, business partner, etc.

3. You definitely need to get serious about key management because your ability to read your old encrypted email depends on retaining those keys. This is obviously not impossible but it has a cost when you think about the need to store them securely in a manner which can be restored after the inevitable system failures and compromises.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by toast0 on Thursday September 17, 2020 @07:40PM (#24511278)
> 2. Adoption hasn't been enough to be able to ban untrusted senders. This could still be quite useful for, say, a hard requirement that *@example.com must have signatures but it doesn't help with really common phishing tactics like pretending to be a vendor, business partner, etc.

Preventing forgery of @example.com is nice, but sadly doesn't matter that much, because a message fro "Your Boss" <[email protected]> is just going to show up as Your Boss in the UI with most clients these days, amd Enterprise oriented clients are worse than the norm. The fastest way to see the actual addresses is to just press reply, which is irritating.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by acdha on Thursday September 17, 2020 @09:28PM (#24512000)
Or even “hey, I’m away from the office and lost my company phone. Can you help me …” attempts using an obvious third-party service. All of these have fooled people in the past and you really need high adoption rates to seriously reduce the odds.
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by toast0 on Friday September 18, 2020 @06:52PM (#24522626)
The one that almost got me was

      From: "John Q Boss"
      Subject: "the blog is down"

      Can you check <a href="http://0-dayfuntimes.example.org">http://blog.example.com</a>
Of course, that came in on my phone, as I was leaving for the day, and phone doesn't show email address or link destination. :(
Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by epistasis on Friday September 18, 2020 @12:05AM (#24512884)
> blocking code in the UI thread – open a message and Outlook won't paint until it can verify the cert

Yikes. I should probably be surprised, but I guess I'm not. This sort of thing goes a long ways towards explaining all sorts of other oddities or using Outlook.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by acdha on Friday September 18, 2020 @08:58AM (#24516116)
Outlook is _old_ and predates threading being a mature OS primitive. I remember reporting bugs of this class against Office 97.

They seem to be extremely hesitant to change it, which I assume is due to the corporate plugin ecosystem.

Re:21 years after the request OpenPGP support gets added to ... by aj3 on Tuesday September 22, 2020 @04:13AM (#24552130)
S/MIME does not protect from phishing.