What are the pros and cons of this approach?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%27s_Anti-Concentratio...
I'm also not sure what the benefit would be? The compliance/reporting/disclosure obligations would be more or less the same as creating a "founders class" of stock with juiced voting rights.
It's outside of tech, but a recent case I have followed all the way through is Katanga Mining (TSX:KAT), now delisted. It was a company engaged in mining in the DRC, owned 88% at the time by mining conglomerate Glencore with the rest mostly by retail shareholders. The mine was still being built, so there were no or minimal revenues, but lots of debt from financing the construction. All that debt was contracted from Glencore directly and put on Katanga's book. The rates were pretty insane (12+%) considering the risk of the venture.
Now this is where the obvious conflict of interest arises. First, it's obvious that Glencore benefited from raising the interest rate as high as possible. The debt was becoming so large, and with interest rates so high, any future earnings from the mine were mostly going to go to repayment of that debt. If you're a holder of Katanga directly, that means you get to see no earnings, but if you're Glencore, you still receive all of them from the debt payments. Funnily enough, the DRC was also part of this venture, with a stake in the mine under deployment, thus sharing some of the debt. They complained about the scheme, as it was plainly obvious to them as well, and asked Glencore to eliminate part of this debt or risk seeing the mine nationalized. Glencore complied and moved some of that debt to Katanga's books. It still had an impact to them, but there was an even more disproportionate one to retail holders of Katanga.
There is nothing shareholders could have done because Glencore called all the shots due to their 88% ownership. The stock obviously tanked over time and Glencore eventually swept in to buy all of the remaining shares at extremely depressed valuations. Shortly before that happened, they had even done a stock offering for "debt recapitalization", which attracted no interest but tanked the share price even further.
In less extreme examples, you can still see it with royalty payments to the parent company, or other dubious transactions like that between the two.
In a company, you have a board and you have shareholders. If you don't want the mould of a public company, you create or keep it as a private company. In a private company, you can do any of these employee stock options or buybacks or long term things, much as you can do with a public company, if you wanted to. The board and the shareholders have a similar sort of dynamic in both, but I would say the board of a private company invites less scrutiny, or at least less fully public scrutiny.
So what is the difference between a public company and a private company---in the context of this discussion? The main difference is that in a private company, especially if you didn't set up your shareholders agreement in a friendly way, you can have deadlocks where shareholders can't sell their stock.
This I think is what JPMorgan is targeting, and based on my experience, it's a pretty clever segment of the market to try something, since, as the article and I mention, private companies have inherent difficulties to trade stock (especially if the shareholders are not fond of each other). The stock value of private companies can be undervalued too, and this would mean that JPMorgan would create additional cash out of thin air. Or rather, by analogy magically unlock lost Bitcoin wallets.
Some examples of private companies: Carlsberg, Lidl, Aldi, Deloitte, PWC, IKEA, Koch Industries.
What I find interesting is that this article about private companies was posted after the, ehm, funny LTSE one (seriously, the London Stock Exchange is LSE...) and it would arguably be the closest existing structure where you are not bound by public company expectation, and in theory you could build a rather charitable setup from a private company, much like the LTSE article's prose likes to promise.