Re:Why online voting is harder than online banking
by tomlagier on Saturday September 12, 2020 @08:35PM
(#24457186)
Isn't this a problem with all voting? Even if you do it in a secluded booth, you could just take a picture with a discrete camera.
Re:Why online voting is harder than online banking
by denulu on Tuesday September 15, 2020 @02:13AM
(#24478349)
Even before cameras, you could go in with a pre-filled ballot and go out with a blank one. All someone needed to verify paid votes was one ballot per polling station (or 2 if voters get 2 ballots).
Re:Why online voting is harder than online banking
by anoncake on Sunday September 13, 2020 @06:46AM
(#24459958)
You could fill out the ballot as you were instructed, take a picture, and ask for a new one which you actually cast. We could even give everyone two ballots by default since asking for a replacement would be suspicious.
Re:Why online voting is harder than online banking
by Spivak on Saturday September 12, 2020 @05:49PM
(#24456145)
Right but you forgot the escape hatch, that you can vote in-person on Election Day to override your mail-in ballot. This gives you the ability to vote for B while appearing to vote for A.
Re:Why online voting is harder than online banking
by PureParadigm on Saturday September 12, 2020 @05:58PM
(#24456218)
Correct me if I'm misunderstanding, but at least in California this doesn't seem to be the case: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/voting-cal...
It says you should bring in your mail-in ballot to the polling place, and if you don't then you can cast a provisional ballot "which will be counted after your county elections official has confirmed you are registered to vote in that county and did not vote more than once in that election." Based on that wording it sounds like if you already submitted a vote-by-mail ballot, then you would have already voted and your provisional ballot won't be counted.
Re:Why online voting is harder than online banking
by thaumasiotes on Saturday September 12, 2020 @06:08PM
(#24456299)
> This gives you the ability to vote for B while appearing to vote for A.
Sure, as long as you're fine with whatever retribution the guy you sold your vote to chooses to take.
A goal there is to have absolute plausible deniability - that even if you absolutely wanted to show to someone that you voted for A, then we need to ensure that you could do that show even while actually voting for B. If you want to fill out a paper ballot and put it in a tamper evident envelope, then it's important to ensure that nobody can watch (current solutions include in-person voting, and for people who physically can't come, my local elections include an election committee visiting these pre-arranged houses and collecting ballots while ensuring secrecy, i.e. that it can't be filled by a family member). If you want to take a picture of a filled ballot, then we need to ensure that either you can very easily take a picture of a ballot filled differently than you actually voted, or that you can't take such a picture. In systems where you have multiple ballot sheets (e.g. one for each party) and put the one you choose in the ballot box, and the others (for whom you didn't vote) stay outside, then you need to ensure that either everyone can easily and anonymously leave with a set of ballots as if they voted for someone else, or either noone can leave with these ballots.
This is a problem with digital voting. For example, there are various schemes of digital voting you can verify that your vote was counted properly while still remaining anonymous without your cooperation. But it needs to ensure that the vote remains anonymous even if your cooperation can be forced or bought.