Chromium's Impact on Root DNS Traffic

Re:Chromium's Impact on Root DNS Traffic by tptacek on Friday August 21, 2020 @04:00PM (#24238339)

DNSSEC can only distinguish valid from invalid NXDOMAINs on signed zones. A tiny, tiny minority of zones in .COM, .NET, .ORG, and .IO are signed. Installing your own local DNSSEC resolver to "fix" the Chrome URL bar would be a tremendous misallocation of effort.

If your ISP forges NXDOMAIN responses, the correct response is to DOH to a provider that doesn't do that. That's a simple networking config change, for which there is UI in every mainstream operating system. The DNSSEC part of this conversation is just silly.

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Re:Chromium's Impact on Root DNS Traffic by AndyMcConachie on Friday August 21, 2020 @07:06PM (#24239838)

Do whatever you want as your proposed mitigation, but we are talking about the root zone here, which is signed.

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Re:Chromium's Impact on Root DNS Traffic by tptacek on Saturday August 22, 2020 @01:01AM (#24241682)

My proposed mitigation is being deployed in every modern browser, and completely eliminates the ISP-spoofed NXDOMAIN problem. Yours asks users to install their own DNS server, and still doesn't eliminate the problem. I'm comfortable saying that my advice is correct, and the advice to use DNSSEC to solve this problem is malpractice.

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