The idea you're stating is something like "It's not possible to prove hypothesis H1 if H1 is 'all swans are white' by sampling swans and only getting white ones, but it's possible to disprove hypothesis H1 by finding a black swan."
However, you can prove hypothesis H2 that "there exists a black swan" by finding such a swan. And you can't really disprove it for the same reason that you can't prove H1.
Neither of theses hypotheses are proven/disproven in the mathematical sense of "proof" but finding sufficient evidence in favor or against a hypothesis is practically the same in the case of science.
The Bayesian version of this is that the hypothesis is something like "the probability of a swan being white is P" and the value of P will by updated based on the strength of the evidence. It will never be exactly 0 or 1, but it will be close enough in many cases. Then you avoid the argument about whether a hypothesis is a binary "true" or "false" but discuss a continuous probability. E.g, the a hypothesis about the Earth being round has a probability close to one for most people while Russell's teapot and Sagan's invisible dragon have probabilities close to zero until evidence shows otherwise.
To cite a paper I currently read:
> "As Chalmers (1999) remarks, when we turn to history of science, the idea that falsificationism is actively undertaken borders on laughable (see especially Feyerabend, 1975). Not only do scientists exhibit extreme reluctance to falsify their work (Woodward and Goodstein, 1996), but if falsification had been followed as a scientific method, then many of the theories generated by some of the best minds in science would never have progressed beyond their earliest explications (see Chalmers, 1999: ch. 7; Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970c: 234; 1970d: 13; Von Dietz, 2001: 22)." (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1350508409104504)
I haven't read all the sources. But it's worth mentioning that your point is controversial.
Popper knew this, by the way. So the inverse to the trap you point out here is the claims that "if not falsifiable, then unable to be true/useful", which is just as specious.
What systems for determining the truth exist that aren't built on top of some fundamental axioms?
my point is that "we define science as empirical falsificationism" is itself nonscientific by its own definition, and that that's OK, still capable of being true, and is a handy way to get stuff done.
but at this point i would say that "religion" is a very squirmy thing to define meaningfully without a lot of "well, but except when ..." clauses tacked onto the end.
these days, we adopt models. discard them if they fail and start all over again. seems to be a better and more elegant way.
For this to work, a hypothesis must be falsifiable. Most pseudoscience (and religion) makes non-falsifiable claims, meaning they are incompatible with scientific discourse.
This simple observation is a powerful tool in any bullshit-detection kit.
Once produced, a scientific hypothesis of any merit will be attacked vigorously with experiments until enough parties are convinced that disproof is sufficiently unlikely. The process isn't always pleasant for those making the falsifiable claims.
Sadly, this is not how science is taught in most schools. There, students are given the "truth" and, on a good day, asked to verify it experimentally. We are now living with the terrible consequences of generations of youth who think science is about "proving" the truth.