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Re:Sandboxing and workload isolation by iancarroll on Thursday July 30, 2020 @06:09PM (#24003409)
We've deployed nsjail for our file conversion pipeline (i.e. ImageMagick) and it's been great -- very nice configuration language and strong isolation properties, with a manageable performance hit. Definitely easy to write a configuration that would not securely sandbox you, though, which seems like a strong point towards Docker or other more high-level solutions.
Re:Sandboxing and workload isolation by browsergap on Thursday July 30, 2020 @09:25PM (#24004692)
I might look at nsjail. I run chrome headless inside of cgroups (for cpu and memory restrictions) and using a runtime generated no-login user (for privilege restrictions), and with a custom group id (for IP tables bandwidth and routing restrictions). Plus I monitor the pool of chromes with a shell script and if any exceed a resource threshold, I used cpulimit then pkill to take care of it.

I could just use docker (and I have docker images of this app that some people like to run) but I think this way is more lightweight, gives me more explicit control, and leans into the OS level security features, like privileges and cgroups with a couple of Unix commands.

Re:Sandboxing and workload isolation by sitkack on Friday July 31, 2020 @01:12AM (#24005874)
I thought I was the only one running workloads in headless browsers! We should start a club for just us NaN.
Re:Sandboxing and workload isolation by browsergap on Friday July 31, 2020 @07:55AM (#24007786)
OK, come join my club! https://github.com/dosyago send me an email :)