The problem isn't politics, the problem is construction logistics. Nobody knows how to build large projects effectively anymore, whether it's the Big Dig or something super complicated like miles of piping with precision welds and specialized concrete pours.

If you want to find out why nuclear hasn't worked, look into all the individual cases of construction from Vogtle to VC Summer to Hinkley to the UK's Sizewell C, to all of France's EPR efforts.

What you will find is that political fear and regulations are not the problem. It's just management. And when you go back to the US's failures in the late 70s and 80s, you see a similar story of management failure causing construction financial disasters.

Even South Korea's apparent successes in construction have been rocked by revelations that inspections were skipped and completed through corruption, nor competence.

The primary reason nuclear survives in discussion, IMHO, is as a political wedge issue. Actual political discussion has no connection to reality of the subject matter (as is the case with too much of politics). Shelleneberger is a prime example of the afactual debate when it comes to nuclear. He's looking for ways to convince people, and attract followers, not in rational and informed discussion, and a few minutes of fact checking typically makes short work of his screeds. The anti-nuclear political argumentation is just as bad, and as easily destroyed.

The solution is to elevate the debate, and look for actual ways to build nuclear if one thinks it will be a useful tool. That means abandoning the large reactor model and trying SMRs; however I have little hope of those being economical, unless the waste heat or primary has some specialized industrial uses that are uneconomical from electrically driven processes. But at least the will likely be constructable.