For a very broad definition of "you" and for an unconventionally small set called "everyone". If you are forced to quarantine, a lot of people will know about your infection anyways, completely without any convoluted mental gymnastics about theoretical deanonyzation possibilities. Epidemic control has always been a very low privacy endeavor and app-based tracing following the Google/Apple model doesn't change that the tiniest bit. In fact of it was fully deployed it could replace a lot of far more invasive tracing, causing a net increase in privacy.

[1] https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/cu...

[1] technically this is optional, but not doing so also means you're not reporting your infected status to others, which kills the point of contact tracing.

The hypothetical malicious actor would need to have (1) listened at some location where you were and captured the key you were broadcasting at the time, (2) identified you by some other means, such as face recognition, while you were at that location, and (3) infiltrated the server where your phone uploaded its daily keys so they could find out what other keys came from the same device as the one they captured and correlated with you already.

If they do all that then they could tell which other locations they were capturing key broadcasts at that you visited.

If they have not gained access to the data at the upload server, then all they get from matching your key to your real identity at one location is what other key listening location you visited before the key rotated.

They could put the face recognition systems (or whatever they are using) at their other key listening stations...but then they don't need the keys.

This seems like a lot of effort for little gain on the part of the malicious actor.