Edit to add: Also, it’s public knowledge that TOR is funded by the DoD, it seems extremely feasible that they privately control a sizable chunk of nodes. Based on what I know of American 3 letter agencies, I don’t think one could resist designing a “secure” system only they can listen in on.
I consider TOR a very secure messaging channel between you, the other party, and the American government (metadata only, but that’s really not too big of a limitation in this case).
The design of the system is resilient to some nodes being under hostile control, too.
Some nodes can be under hostile control, but as the number increases the likelihood increases that they can link entry to exit based on timings. I consider it quite likely that the us govt can say “hey Germany/UK/Fance/etc., we have this batch of exit times, do any of your nodes correspond on entry?” or vice virce.
As an aside, the five eyes countries collaborate much more closely with one another than they do with France or Germany (or that was the case when I read about this after the Snowden leaks.)
This always has been and always will be the security rabbit hole. (Well, one of them.)
How do you define "know for a fact"? Even if you personally know a person managing an egress node, how do you know they aren't operating on behalf of someone else?