Looking for recent research, there seems to only be one group modelling nuclear winter scenarios, and those papers seem to be using the 1980s-era numbers for soot generation without commentary on how valid those assumptions are (other than to say that it's contentious) [1]. I don't see any papers directly discussing soot generation in relation to nuclear winter, and I suspect our large-scale fire modelling is not yet capable of answering the question of what the resulting fire from a nuclear warhead strike on NYC would look like.

I'm personally on the side that thinks the stratospheric injection of large-scale metropolitan fires is wildly overestimated (the Kuwaiti oil fires failing to reach that level being evidence of that point), which means that the risks of nuclear winter

[1] And the paper itself has a section on implications for nuclear policy, which sets off motivated-to-reach-a-conclusion research alarm bells for me.

I'm skeptical of this; in the 20th century there were more than 500 atmospheric nuclear tests. Given that, it seems unlikely that a ""small"" nuclear war would necessarily cause such dramatic effects as humanity-destroying nuclear winter. This said, cities getting nuked would probably launch more soot into the atmosphere than the desert or ocean getting nuked, so... maybe?

But I think we should try to avoid finding out for sure. ;)

Some later Googling of mine found some stuff about how the nuclear winter theorists's models made predictions that oil well fires would result in a small scale global winter, but the Kuwaiti oil files did not confirm that prediction.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter#Kuwait_wells_in...:

> One of the major results of TTAPS' 1990 paper was the re-iteration of the team's 1983 model that 100 oil refinery fires would be sufficient to bring about a small scale, but still globally deleterious nuclear winter.[109]...

> In articles printed in the Wilmington Morning Star and the Baltimore Sun newspapers in January 1991, prominent authors of nuclear winter papers – Richard P. Turco, John W. Birks, Carl Sagan, Alan Robock and Paul Crutzen – collectively stated that they expected catastrophic nuclear winter like effects with continental-sized effects of sub-freezing temperatures as a result of the Iraqis going through with their threats of igniting 300 to 500 pressurized oil wells that could subsequently burn for several months.[110][111][112]

> As threatened, the wells were set on fire by the retreating Iraqis in March 1991, and the 600 or so burning oil wells were not fully extinguished until November 6, 1991, eight months after the end of the war,[113] and they consumed an estimated six million barrels of oil per day at their peak intensity....

> The atmospheric scientist tasked with studying the atmospheric effect of the Kuwaiti fires by the National Science Foundation, Peter Hobbs, stated that the fires' modest impact suggested that "some numbers [used to support the Nuclear Winter hypothesis]... were probably a little overblown."[119]

> Hobbs found that at the peak of the fires, the smoke absorbed 75 to 80% of the sun's radiation. The particles rose to a maximum of 20,000 feet (6,100 m), and when combined with scavenging by clouds the smoke had a short residency time of a maximum of a few days in the atmosphere.[120][121]

> Pre-war claims of wide scale, long-lasting, and significant global environmental effects were thus not borne out, and found to be significantly exaggerated by the media and speculators,[122] with climate models by those not supporting the nuclear winter hypothesis at the time of the fires predicting only more localized effects such as a daytime temperature drop of ~10 °C within 200 km of the source.[123]