Read this sentence again: A simple browser plugin that implements TOFU/POP on top of PKI would be an excellent start.
That would - at least to start with - be additional security.
I don't disagree with that.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS
by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:47PM
(#2376594)
> Browsers are introduced to websites all the time.
I care most about a handful of sites, most of which are controlled either by me or by people I trust. My co-located mail server would be one of these sites.
How many times do you set up new computers, or install new browsers, or access a site you care about from a friend's computer? And: you're someone particularly careful about which sites you access. But how is this going to work for my mom? If the problems we're concerned about are government wiretapping and fraud, how does creating a guaranteed and predictable flow of insecure connections not make the problem worse?
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS
by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:09PM
(#2376649)
Well, it appears that you are responding in the context of the original paper ("let's fix this mess") and I am thinking in the context on my own, very specific immediate need. I do want TOFU/POP now.
Use Firefox only to access your few trusted sites, and use Chrome or Safari to access the rest of the Internet. Delete all the CA certificates from Firefox. Visit your trusted cites, adding their certs to Firefox as the warnings pop up.
There. You now have "tofu/pop".
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS
by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:17PM
(#2376674)
Strange thing there's no emacs in the picture :) Call me eccentric but I don't want to use two browsers, or even two browser profiles. I'd rather make a one time setup change and then go back to my established way of doing things.
"every first introduction between a browser and a website is insecure, so that subsequent connections might be less insecure."
I think the claim is that this is already the case. There are certificate signing certificates in the hands of people who should not have them and there's no accounting of who has them (beyond the government mentioned) or what they're doing with them. I don't think this presentation is suggesting deleting all your installed CAs, just monitoring whether things are changing under you and coordinating those observations with others you trust. The coordination certainly goes beyond on the SSH model.
If you believe that, and you don't want to apply software engineering to that problem, then just delete all your CA keys and accept back the ones corresponding to sites you trust. No change to SSL is required to make that process work.
This doesn't look like a win to me. Browsers are introduced to websites all the time.
To me, this solution looks like "let's accept an ambient loss of ~5-10% of all connections to MITM attacks, because it's politically too hard to configure the PKI-based SSL protocol properly".