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Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:25PM (#2376546)
YES. Please somebody make this.

Paint me paranoid, but CA-assisted man in the middle attacks is a real source of concern for me. I would absolutely love to have the SSH-style trust model for my HTTPS connections and I will pay good money for an implementation. A simple browser plugin that implements TOFU/POP on top of PKI would be an excellent start.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by jmillikin on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:56PM (#2376619)
You can have it today! No money or plugins needed. And it only takes a minute to get started.

Just delete your CA list.

Go into your browser's preferences. Find the "security" section. It should have a button to open up the list of trusted certificate authorities.

Delete them all.

Now, every time you connect to a secure page, one of two things will happen:

1. If you've never visited that page before, your browser will prompt you for instructions. Use whatever means you like (second browser, remote server, call them, etc) to verify the server's SSL fingerprint. If it checks out, mark it as valid (aka "add an exception").

2. If you have visited that site before, its exception will already be present in your browser, and it will work like normal.

After a few days of this, you'll see why the SSH model hasn't seen widespread adoption for HTTPS.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Udo on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:42PM (#2376733)
What you describe is exactly the behavior the author calls "Firefox' war on self-signed certificates". The actual proposal calls for a browser that does NOT prompt the user all the time. It would just prompt when something extraordinary happens (such as the server's already known certificate changing).

> After a few days of this, you'll see why the SSH model hasn't seen widespread adoption for HTTPS

That's not really true. It has simply never been done for browsers, because many people think it's an abomination and, to paraphrase well-known HNers from previous discussions, supposedly useless and little more than obfuscation instead of encryption.

It's not the first time TOFU/POP has been suggested on HN, too. I find it curious this proposal got so many upvotes here today. I don't remember that many people coming to mine and other people's defenses when we suggested the exact same thing a few months back and crypto gurus were rending their hair like we had committed the most stupidly blasphemous act conceivable to modern computer science.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by jmillikin on Sunday March 27, 2011 @10:07PM (#2376809)
The first time you connect to an SSH server, your client will display that server's key, and prompt for instructions.

Notably, SSH will not automatically connect. It asks first. That's why it's useful. Additionally, SSH is such a niche tool that its users can be expected to be security-minded -- for example, by checking that the fingerprint matches the expected string instead of just clicking through.

If browsers automatically trusted a page the first time they hit, attackers can just redirect the user to http://paypa1.com/ and feed them a fancy, green-url certificate.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Udo on Sunday March 27, 2011 @10:10PM (#2376818)
Replicating SSH's UI is not the point here.

> Notably, SSH will not automatically connect. It asks first. That's why it's useful.

How many sysadmins really do check their newly installed server's fingerprint? They just type "yes" on first connect and grab the server's certificate. I believe very few people actually do manual loopups when SSH pops the first-connection warning.

Most hosting providers will send you cleartext passwords for your server by email. When you log onto that server for the first time, there is no easy way to tell if you're the victim of an elaborate MITM attack. So that's happening right now.

> If browsers automatically trusted a page the first time they hit, attackers can just redirect the user to http://paypa1.com/ and feed them a fancy, green-url certificate.

Indeed they can. Nobody's suggesting otherwise. By the way, I can do that today, by registering a cert for paypa1.com, just to see how many people actually take a second look at the content of the certificate.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Sunday March 27, 2011 @10:43PM (#2376894)
You really need to start looking more carefully at those SSH messages. In particular, the fact that you get an SSH warning when a site's key suddenly changes is 99% of the security value of SSH.

It was an old Usenix conference trick --- I think it's Dug Song's, but I'm not really sure --- to snarf people's SSH logins by capitalizing on their lack of interest in those messages. It's a trivial attack.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Udo on Sunday March 27, 2011 @10:46PM (#2376901)
I wasn't talking about ignoring any SSH warnings that occur when a site's key suddenly changes. Really, look at my comments, that's not at all what I said, is it?

You are misrepresenting my position and then attacking me for it.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by burgerbrain on Monday March 28, 2011 @01:02AM (#2377210)
There is not a difference between your fingerprint changing, and you not having existing knowledge to compare it to. Your action in either case should be the same.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Steuard on Monday March 28, 2011 @03:27PM (#2379691)
I disagree. If I get a warning out of the blue, yeah, I take it seriously: something unexpected is going on, and I'm not going to trust the server until I know what it is. But if I know there's going to be a server upgrade overnight and I get an SSH warning in the morning, I figure odds are good that it's because of the new server rather than a coincidentally timed MITM attack. That's not perfect security, certainly, but as long as MITM attacks are rare it doesn't cost you that much of SSH's value.

(All bets are off if someone is targeting your organization specifically, of course: they'd presumably have heard about the server changes in advance and take that opportunity to attack. If I considered that a serious concern in my circumstances then I'd ramp up my security level across the board.)

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by justincormack on Monday March 28, 2011 @06:39AM (#2377850)
I have had security conscious hosting providers who have done a proper fingerprint validation over the phone half each way for ssh fingerprints. Its rare though. Sign of a good provider...
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by cabacon on Monday March 28, 2011 @11:46AM (#2378769)
However, see-also DNSSEC and http://benctechnicalblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/sshfp-dns.html

Though I guess DNSSEC puts you back at PKI ...

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:13PM (#2376666)
Ha-ha-ha. Not too practical, is it?

There are my own servers and there is the rest of the Internet. I want to use self-signed certs on my servers and I want these to be sticky. If any of these servers would suddenly start presenting different certificates (most notably, signed by a CA that sits on browser's trusted list), I want to know about this lovely fact.

For the rest of the Internet I can live with existing PKI.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by caf on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:50PM (#2376748)
That plugin already exists - if you run Firefox, install "Certificate Patrol". It will tell you whenever a site's certificate changes, and it'll show the relevant fields of the old and new certificates side-by-side, so that you can decide whether the change looks benign or malignant.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by kahawe on Monday March 28, 2011 @04:49AM (#2377670)
Ever since they changed Firefox's behavior when an unknown certificate is encountered this would be especially crippling.

I can understand why this might be a good feature to have for end-users and internet novices but why isn't there an option to revert it back to the old "yes/no" box instead of having to click 5 times when I know exactly why there is a self-signed certificate in use...

Also, considering this:

> Global PKI, as currently implemented in browsers, does not work.

makes this feature even more dubious and even worse, together with the green SSL indicator it gives a false sense of security.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Silhouette on Monday March 28, 2011 @05:09AM (#2377701)
> Ever since they changed Firefox's behavior when an unknown certificate is encountered this would be especially crippling.

Yes, that is possibly the single most annoying thing about any piece of software ever written, at least for those of us who develop secured web sites (and therefore self-sign all kinds of stuff before going to production).

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by omh on Monday March 28, 2011 @05:23AM (#2377716)
If it causes that much irritation, have you considered making your own CA, adding it to your browsers, and then using that to sign your temporary certificates?

It's quite straightforward to do this with openssl.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Silhouette on Monday March 28, 2011 @05:36AM (#2377752)
I suppose that would be a possibility, but we'd still have to configure every browser on every machine to support that CA and then generate a certificate for every new project. I'd rather just be able to click once in my browser to accept the unsigned certificate, instead of jumping through tedious hoops that I don't believe really help anyone.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by acdha on Monday March 28, 2011 @10:30AM (#2378467)
So rather than click once to install your internal CA you'd prefer to click once for every new site you add?
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Silhouette on Monday March 28, 2011 @10:32AM (#2378472)
You're assuming it would be a single CA. That is, unfortunately, unlikely: we work on a variety of projects for various clients and in conjunction with various other contractors/development teams, and each project will have its own requirements for what needs to be signed and by whom. About the only thing they do have in common is that no-one goes out and spends lots of money on certs for every random development server they're using, they all self-sign in one form or another.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by kahawe on Monday March 28, 2011 @09:01AM (#2378178)
> If it causes that much irritation, have you considered making your own CA, adding it to your browsers, and then using that to sign your temporary certificates?

A good fix but under the light of the looming issues describe in the link above: why invest all that time implementing and then defending this feature in the first place - for a negligible (at best) security benefit?

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:40PM (#2376581)
How is key continuity any better than PKI against man-in-the-middle attacks? The tradeoff is simple: every first introduction between a browser and a website is insecure, so that subsequent connections might be less insecure.

This doesn't look like a win to me. Browsers are introduced to websites all the time.

To me, this solution looks like "let's accept an ambient loss of ~5-10% of all connections to MITM attacks, because it's politically too hard to configure the PKI-based SSL protocol properly".

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by Skalman on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:49PM (#2376599)
Read this sentence again: A simple browser plugin that implements TOFU/POP on top of PKI would be an excellent start.

That would - at least to start with - be additional security.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:57PM (#2376622)
I don't disagree with that.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:47PM (#2376594)
> Browsers are introduced to websites all the time.

I care most about a handful of sites, most of which are controlled either by me or by people I trust. My co-located mail server would be one of these sites.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:56PM (#2376618)
How many times do you set up new computers, or install new browsers, or access a site you care about from a friend's computer? And: you're someone particularly careful about which sites you access. But how is this going to work for my mom? If the problems we're concerned about are government wiretapping and fraud, how does creating a guaranteed and predictable flow of insecure connections not make the problem worse?
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:09PM (#2376649)
Well, it appears that you are responding in the context of the original paper ("let's fix this mess") and I am thinking in the context on my own, very specific immediate need. I do want TOFU/POP now.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:11PM (#2376656)
Use Firefox only to access your few trusted sites, and use Chrome or Safari to access the rest of the Internet. Delete all the CA certificates from Firefox. Visit your trusted cites, adding their certs to Firefox as the warnings pop up.

There. You now have "tofu/pop".

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by huhtenberg on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:17PM (#2376674)
Strange thing there's no emacs in the picture :) Call me eccentric but I don't want to use two browsers, or even two browser profiles. I'd rather make a one time setup change and then go back to my established way of doing things.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by mentat on Sunday March 27, 2011 @09:50PM (#2376749)
"every first introduction between a browser and a website is insecure, so that subsequent connections might be less insecure."

I think the claim is that this is already the case. There are certificate signing certificates in the hands of people who should not have them and there's no accounting of who has them (beyond the government mentioned) or what they're doing with them. I don't think this presentation is suggesting deleting all your installed CAs, just monitoring whether things are changing under you and coordinating those observations with others you trust. The coordination certainly goes beyond on the SSH model.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Sunday March 27, 2011 @10:40PM (#2376882)
If you believe that, and you don't want to apply software engineering to that problem, then just delete all your CA keys and accept back the ones corresponding to sites you trust. No change to SSL is required to make that process work.
Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by nikcub on Sunday March 27, 2011 @08:56PM (#2376617)
> SSH-style trust model for my HTTPS connections and I will pay good money for an implementation

You can do that now. Note the cert ID first time you login. If it is different the next time you login, then it is a different cert.

This would be an easy browser extension.