GSM encryption is also pretty broken, e.g.

> In 2006 Elad Barkan, Eli Biham and Nathan Keller demonstrated attacks against A5/1, A5/3, or even GPRS that allow attackers to tap GSM mobile phone conversations and decrypt them either in real-time, or at any later time

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A5/1

I assume, depending on your aircraft, it was your dirtbox putting out a stronger signal operating as a MITM.

Not to be a jerk, but this seems like a really inappropriate venue to discuss operational details like this. Especially capabilities/vulnerabilities that, if they do exist, would be classified and concerning a location where the US still conducts military operations.

None of the above is classified, to my knowledge. A quick google search of this capability returns https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stingray_phone_tracker

The techniques are not classified, although LE fought tooth and nails to keep details out of court cases for years. IMO, the state doesn't have the right to even keep it non-public.

I recommend looking up Executive Order 13526 and the differences between a state’s ability to classify information vs. the Federal government’s. Also recommend taking a look at the elements for doing so. Lastly, I would also take a look at SF-312 and the commitment those with access to classified information make. Outside of that, I’m not going to go into this further.