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Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by sokoloff on Sunday June 28, 2020 @02:29PM (#23670932)
Why do you need to use self-signed certs? (As contrasted with CA-signed certs that happen to be signed by a CA that you own and trust as suggested by arwineap?)

It took my a little over an hour one evening to figure out how to create my own CA, trust it, and sign certs for all my local devices (except my UniFi cloud controller which I admit I gave up on due to time).

Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by CydeWeys on Sunday June 28, 2020 @02:33PM (#23670965)
Because 99.99%+ of users don't have the technical skill to do this, but still need to be able to access local devices and it would sure be good if they could do so in a secure manner?
Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by CountSessine on Sunday June 28, 2020 @02:43PM (#23671056)
So the answer is to subvert the global certificate infrastructure that protects web traffic? No, it isn’t. Your IoT device has no security at all if a non-technical user is setting it up or if it doesn’t have a way of accepting a user configured certificate, and you shouldn’t pretend otherwise by dressing it up in bad certificates and worthless encrypted tunnels.

Just use HTTP.

Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by Spivak on Sunday June 28, 2020 @04:18PM (#23671726)
I mean if they’re worthless tunnels then so is every SSH tunnel. Should we just go back to telnet?
Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by CountSessine on Sunday June 28, 2020 @06:16PM (#23672515)
On your own network? Does it really matter whether you use telnet or ssh? And if it’s on a shared network, don’t you have an IT department that can set up the local key infrastructure and push out certificates?

The argument here is that we should enable lots of shitty IoT devices to masquerade as being secure, and inure browser users to click ‘yes’ to accepting a broken certificate.

If it’s on a managed network, IT can set up a certificate and push that out to client machines. If it’s on your home network you can do that (unless your IoT device can’t take a user configured client cert, in which case it’s rubbish anyways), and if you can’t then you might as well use HTTP.

Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by imtringued on Monday June 29, 2020 @05:56AM (#23676002)
Ok we can always use HTTP instead. I personally hate how using HTTPS gets harder and harder every single year.
Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by petronio on Sunday June 28, 2020 @02:42PM (#23671051)
A lot of the devices mentioned ("routers, printers, and self-hosted IoT devices") don't give ways to change the certificate. Besides, not every individual or company wants to or is knowledgeable enough to manage their own CA. For the audience in HN it might be an hour one evening, to others the instructions read like black magic.
Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by sukilot on Sunday June 28, 2020 @03:06PM (#23671205)
Routing is scary magic. DNS is scary magic. Wifi is scary magic. Everything in computing is scary magic until someone writes an app with good UX for it. It's not a fundamental problem.
Re:Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS c... by petronio on Sunday June 28, 2020 @04:33PM (#23671813)
It is a fundamental problem, because you need specialized knowledge to understand what is being presented and asked of you in the UI.

The average user knows absolutely nothing about routing, most will throw their hands up or their eyes will swim if you so much as mention something like IP address.

They also know nothing about DNS and don't have to: because we always give them defaults that they never see and they go along with their lives.

As for wifi, once again, largely automated. Most people never change the default SSID and password. There's some manufacturers that will make a good UI, but it stops at the SSID and passwords because that's the extent of most users' understanding. Some users have a vague understanding that 2.4GHz and 5GHz is different, but don't know the significance of the difference. Channel, authentication type, and other options aren't given to users in those UIs because they simply wouldn't know what to do with it and people don't read manuals anyways.