> A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the same consideration would seem to require excusing him from liability for acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied.
- https://www.leagle.com/decision/1967933386us5471842
I don't agree with this because ignorance of the law is not usually an excuse, but I imagine a majority of Congress might. However, the courts have gradually expanded "reasonably believed to be valid" to mean there must be "precisely factually on-point caselaw" determining the actions are unconstitutional. Sort of a frog in boiling water situation where a well-meaning member of Congress might not realize there was a problem until decades after the initial decision.
I think that mens rea[1] should be more broadly required. Our current system is such that virtually everyone is breaking the law and only enforcement and prosecutorial discretion protects us.
It's about understanding the consequences of your actions, nothing to do with knowledge of the law.
Currently, if an officer violates your rights on purpose, but there's no "precisely factually on-point caselaw" deciding what they did is unconstitutional, then they're immune from prosecution. They had mens rea, but it doesn't matter.
The top description on the Wikipedia article says Mens Rea is "the mental element of a person's intention to commit a crime; or knowledge that one's action or lack of action would cause a crime to be committed."
This is to separate the following two scenarios since I think it'll be pretty clear to folks that the justification of punishment is different in the following:
1. A person pushes a button on a blank wall and someone is shot as a result.
2. A person squeezes the trigger of a firearm while that firearm is pointed at someone.
Other than the classic "Don't go around pushing big red buttons" the person in the first scenario is not morally culpable for their actions due to a lack of knowledge of what might follow from their button pushing. This is also the reason why actions like trying to shoot someone and having the gun jam tend not to be distinguished under the law from actually shooting someone (when such a situation can be identified). Your intent in squeezing the trigger was to shoot someone - the fact that the universe happened to intercede and prevent your action was something you could not foresee.
A text message saying "I'm gonna kill that guy" might be evidence of intent, but nobody ever says "I'm gonna kill that guy, thereby committing a felony under US law". How could you possibly prove that somebody knew an action would be illegal?
Would you allow the possibility that Wikipedia is wrong? I can't find any other reference that talks about knowledge of the law itself, and it logically doesn't make any sense. Also, "mens rea" itself is just a vague Latin phrase, so the only meaningful "definition" is how it's actually applied in the world.
I'm far from an expert but I think usually the "reasonable" keyword applies to such things in law. A "reasonable" person would know killing is wrong - and they'll say you mightn't, too bad, pay attention to society.
A "reasonable" person might not know some obscure tax law they broke by mistake so they have to make it right and pay it back, but not be punished too harshly otherwise. OTOH you'd expect an accountant to know so you could infer intent and they could be handled more sternly.
> Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states.
> The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:
> 1. "Intentionally." A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.
> 2. "Knowingly." A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.
> 3. "Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
> 4. "Criminal negligence." A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
As you can see, none of these care whether the person knows that producing the result in question will break the law. This is far and away the norm for mens rea; requirements of knowledge of the law are vanishingly rare.
Note also that these are exactly the same categories as defined by the Model Penal Code. (Strict liability excluded.) The only change is that the word "purposefully" in the MPC was changed to "intentionally". So you're not even right that this is "a definition used in a statute that was never enacted".
The New York Penal Code doesn't attempt to define, or use, the term mens rea. Rather, it defines levels of "mental culpability" which are themselves referenced in the definitions of crimes. That is what mens rea means. It seems increasingly clear that you don't yourself know the meaning of the term, and you're certainly not more able to dictate a meaning than the state of New York is.
But feel free to compare this Australian legal advice:
> Mens rea offences are offences which, to be proven, must demonstrate an accused both committed the physical act (actus reus) as well as had a guilty mind – that is, the intention to commit the offence (mens rea).
( https://www.gotocourt.com.au/criminal-law/vic/honest-and-rea... )
Australia treats the term mens rea in exactly the same way the state of New York does, by defining different levels of it and using those levels to define crimes. Compare these two crimes defined by the Crimes Act 1958 of Victoria:
> A person who, without lawful excuse, intentionally causes serious injury to another person is guilty of an indictable offence. Penalty: Level 3 imprisonment (20 years maximum). [I.4.16]
> A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly causes serious injury to another person is guilty of an indictable offence. Penalty: Level 4 imprisonment (15 years maximum). [I.4.17]
"On Monday, the Supreme Court ruled that police stops are legal when the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" that a law is being broken—even if that law doesn't exist."
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/when-co...
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/03/how-the-suprem...
The most effective deterrent to "legislating from the bench" is to recall those Justices who did the legislating.
Neither party will do this, though—enacting reforms through the courts is far more efficient than passing difficult legislation through the House, Senate, and the Presidency (all of which can anger voters). Much better to let the courts do it, and give brave speeches to the media about "judicial overreach" when required to appease voters.
> Waiting on the courts to get around to it will not be fast enough, or may never come.
The current situation is working well for everyone with the power to change it (see above).
It's trivial to determine if the court has "legislated from the bench" though: do parties unrelated to the lawsuit in question immediately, after the decision, have to behave substantially differently? Do extremely large numbers of people have to behave substantially differently after the decision?
If they do, that's "legislating from the bench." That's literally the test.
When they don't, a decision only affects the people in the suit and similar situations going forward (precedent). That's just the normal, everyday action of the judiciary branch. It's still "policy" (broadly speaking), but it's not legislating.
In the most recent case, changing literally every Title IX program, overnight—as well as all employment scenarios nationwide—is clearly "legislating from the bench", since it a) applies with immediate effect to large numbers of people not party to the suit, and b) requires them to behave substantially differently than they had before the decision.
(I'm fine with "legislating from the bench", BTW, that's literally how Civil Rights legislation is intended to work. Congress passed responsibility to the courts, just like in other areas they've passed responsibility to the executive branch.)
> do parties unrelated to the lawsuit in question immediately, after the decision, have to behave substantially differently?
The court has not argued in their decision that Congress meant to provide these protections—they explicitly only argued that the law can be (re-)interpreted today as allowing it (using a broad interpretation). They fully admit that Congress at the time did not expect it to be interpreted this way.
That's the "legislating" part of "legislating from the bench": the actual legislators who voted on the original legislation did not intend to cause this behavioral change on ~200M Americans (at the time it was passed). 40 years later, the courts made the decision to legislate that behavior, from the bench.
Personally, I have to admire that kind of Chutzpah—no one will accuse today's court of lacking the will to power. That one of Trump's "conservative" justices wrote the decision is the icing on the cake. :)
Judges as legislators violate this separation, undermining not only key protections on democratic integrity, but the legitimacy of the whole scheme, through its avoidance of that direct democratic accountability.
Note that excessive delegation from the legislature to the executive branch through agencies with rule-making power is also a separations-of-power concern, and there is special law around the procedures by which executive agency rule-making may take place. Another case is executive power being wielded by Congress: Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, argued this March and not yet decided, took on the problem that the head of the CFPB was not accountable to the President.
Power here is the ability of one group to direct/constrain the actions of another.. the judiciary, the executive and the legislature all exercise the same power.
The only thing "separation" achieves is a system of mutual antagonism which functions (poorly) as a system of accountability.
Here, congress at any point can redress "legislating from the bench" (ie., establishing legal precedent) by passing new law. If the judiciary ignores this law, then they can be removed from office.
I cannot see any circumstance here where the legislature has issues new law in redress for a judicial ruling and then the judiciary has gone on to ignore it.
What we're talking about here is when judges have simply "made up rules" where the law fails to provide answers. that is the role of the judiciary in a common law system!
It's what provides for reasonable standards of individual freedom which adapt to the age. rather than havign everyone legislataed by an infinite number of rules est. in 1701
It appears you are also a skeptic of the principle of Separation of Powers to begin with. You are, of course, not asked to accept that this is ideal. I will, however, ask that you accept that this structure was designed and codified into law to uphold that principle, and this is often at the root of (principled) objections when things are done your preferred way. This is a better place to start a conversation, rather than of celebrating your failure to understand (which is meant to imply that something does not make sense, but really says more about your own understanding.)
Imagine an American complaining: "Parliament is so confusing! What is all this drama about 'forming a government' and coalitions? Why can't they just elect a President directly?" The American may or may not have a meaningful point, but if they do have a point, this point is rather ill-served by the venue and the manner in which it is raised. The way in which you raise your objections here is similar.
The constitution itself places a court as its interpretive body: the power of the constitution is exercised by judges, explicitly mandated to interpret it.
Judicial power isn't some "secondary" feature over which congress is meant to preside. It is the primary mechanism of the constitutional order itself.
The american legal order is established, maintained and exercised by the judiciary. There is a mistaken view that Congress as a democratic body has more "legitimacy" and therefore that others exercising power are overstepping their mark. But the american constitution is not democratic, and has no high regard for democracy as the principle authorising source of power.
The founders were far more concerned to rest power in as narrow hands as possible, hence the supreme court and hence the electoral college. There is no such thing as "legislating from the bench" -- this is just judges exercising their constitutional role.
There's probably no better time than right now to get the support needed to pass a law eliminating QI. While we're at it, we can pass a law to replace Bivens rather than have analogous civil rights cases involving federal agents subject to the courts' whims.
Just want to note that legislators are a little less at fault here than they normally are.