It's trivial to determine if the court has "legislated from the bench" though: do parties unrelated to the lawsuit in question immediately, after the decision, have to behave substantially differently? Do extremely large numbers of people have to behave substantially differently after the decision?
If they do, that's "legislating from the bench." That's literally the test.
When they don't, a decision only affects the people in the suit and similar situations going forward (precedent). That's just the normal, everyday action of the judiciary branch. It's still "policy" (broadly speaking), but it's not legislating.
In the most recent case, changing literally every Title IX program, overnight—as well as all employment scenarios nationwide—is clearly "legislating from the bench", since it a) applies with immediate effect to large numbers of people not party to the suit, and b) requires them to behave substantially differently than they had before the decision.
(I'm fine with "legislating from the bench", BTW, that's literally how Civil Rights legislation is intended to work. Congress passed responsibility to the courts, just like in other areas they've passed responsibility to the executive branch.)
> do parties unrelated to the lawsuit in question immediately, after the decision, have to behave substantially differently?
The court has not argued in their decision that Congress meant to provide these protections—they explicitly only argued that the law can be (re-)interpreted today as allowing it (using a broad interpretation). They fully admit that Congress at the time did not expect it to be interpreted this way.
That's the "legislating" part of "legislating from the bench": the actual legislators who voted on the original legislation did not intend to cause this behavioral change on ~200M Americans (at the time it was passed). 40 years later, the courts made the decision to legislate that behavior, from the bench.
Personally, I have to admire that kind of Chutzpah—no one will accuse today's court of lacking the will to power. That one of Trump's "conservative" justices wrote the decision is the icing on the cake. :)
Judges as legislators violate this separation, undermining not only key protections on democratic integrity, but the legitimacy of the whole scheme, through its avoidance of that direct democratic accountability.
Note that excessive delegation from the legislature to the executive branch through agencies with rule-making power is also a separations-of-power concern, and there is special law around the procedures by which executive agency rule-making may take place. Another case is executive power being wielded by Congress: Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, argued this March and not yet decided, took on the problem that the head of the CFPB was not accountable to the President.
Power here is the ability of one group to direct/constrain the actions of another.. the judiciary, the executive and the legislature all exercise the same power.
The only thing "separation" achieves is a system of mutual antagonism which functions (poorly) as a system of accountability.
Here, congress at any point can redress "legislating from the bench" (ie., establishing legal precedent) by passing new law. If the judiciary ignores this law, then they can be removed from office.
I cannot see any circumstance here where the legislature has issues new law in redress for a judicial ruling and then the judiciary has gone on to ignore it.
What we're talking about here is when judges have simply "made up rules" where the law fails to provide answers. that is the role of the judiciary in a common law system!
It's what provides for reasonable standards of individual freedom which adapt to the age. rather than havign everyone legislataed by an infinite number of rules est. in 1701
It appears you are also a skeptic of the principle of Separation of Powers to begin with. You are, of course, not asked to accept that this is ideal. I will, however, ask that you accept that this structure was designed and codified into law to uphold that principle, and this is often at the root of (principled) objections when things are done your preferred way. This is a better place to start a conversation, rather than of celebrating your failure to understand (which is meant to imply that something does not make sense, but really says more about your own understanding.)
Imagine an American complaining: "Parliament is so confusing! What is all this drama about 'forming a government' and coalitions? Why can't they just elect a President directly?" The American may or may not have a meaningful point, but if they do have a point, this point is rather ill-served by the venue and the manner in which it is raised. The way in which you raise your objections here is similar.
The constitution itself places a court as its interpretive body: the power of the constitution is exercised by judges, explicitly mandated to interpret it.
Judicial power isn't some "secondary" feature over which congress is meant to preside. It is the primary mechanism of the constitutional order itself.
The american legal order is established, maintained and exercised by the judiciary. There is a mistaken view that Congress as a democratic body has more "legitimacy" and therefore that others exercising power are overstepping their mark. But the american constitution is not democratic, and has no high regard for democracy as the principle authorising source of power.
The founders were far more concerned to rest power in as narrow hands as possible, hence the supreme court and hence the electoral college. There is no such thing as "legislating from the bench" -- this is just judges exercising their constitutional role.