For example, the "legalization of gay marriage" case from a few years back contained phrases and platitudes about "love not being illegal" but the crux of the decision came down to the majority's opinion that a license issued in one state shouldn't be rejected in another. It didn't specify MARRIAGE license... which immediately made me comment to co-workers that in addition to requiring marriage licenses issued in any state had to be recognized in all 50 states, logically this ruling also stipulated that a concealed carry permit issued in any state would have to be recognized even in states that didn't issue concealed carry permits (Illinois at the time) as well as states in which it's very hard to get them (New York and California). To my knowledge, nobody has tested this by getting arrested in such a jurisdiction with such laws and challenging it citing Obergefell v. Hodges.
First of all, Obergefell was a ruling that the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment and Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment extended protections to same-sex couples. Nothing to do with licenses.
You're thinking of the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution, which was never ruled on with respect to gay marriage. We got close to it with US v. Windsor, but that ruling struck down the whole of DOMA under due process and equal protection, and did not create any kind of binding precedent with regards to the FF&C clause.
Secondly, the text of the FF&C clause is:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Your question is whether a concealed carry permit would be considered a "public Act, Record, or judicial Proceeding" of the issuing state, and I am telling you I don't think you could get a single court to agree with you that it was.
I am not a lawyer™ but damn this would be a fascinating challenge. It almost implies state licenses exceed state lines to an almost federal level which seems pretty counterintuitive to me. I'd almost want to see a lawyer who has a state-level license to practice law challenge this in court to be eligible to use their state-level license in a different state.
If true, fascinating. This post represents only theory interest and no opinion of the top level topic other than this one:
Equality, EFF YEAH!
I think it's closer to stating that a license to $ACTIVITY/$STATUS in one state should be recognized by a different state that also licenses that activity or status.
I'm also not a lawyer but I know the law is complicated enough that if you don't have a law degree you can't just "reason" about it until it makes sense, because it rarely does. Having a license to carry a firearm in Indiana allows you to carry that firearm in Indiana. Illinois would probably agree that that license allows you to carry a firearm in Indiana, and still put you in prison for carrying it on the wrong side of the Illinois-Indiana border. Are there specifics to this argument that would apply to firearms and not marriages?
I could see there being a differentiation in some legalese between an activity (carrying a firearm, hunting, operating an emergency vehicle, etc) and a status (being married, being a felon, etc).
I think I one could say that fishing or hunting licenses only apply to certain locations - you are only able to use methods X in location Y. This out of state the license is valid but not useful.
Then the question is whether gun license is more like a marriage licet or a hunting license.
Once you do get married, though, the marriage itself becomes a public record of the state that would be protected under the Full Faith & Credit clause. But as I mentioned in my previous comment, Obergefell v. Hodges had absolutely nothing to do with marriage licensing and states recognizing each other's licenses.
IANAL.
Yeah that seems very strange. That's what the SCOTUS ... a great deal of the time.
edit: Found it: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Kavanaugh's dissent (p. 145ff.) appears to revolve around it being not the proper province of the Supreme Court to decide the extent of Title VII, which, IANAL but that seems like a weak dodge. The whole point of the Supreme Court is to finally decide among competing interpretations of extant legislation.
Alito's and Thomas's dissent (pp. 38-144) appears to rely on the same strict-constructionist interpretation. Its Appendix A cites a stack of dictionaries. So there's that, I guess. Appendix D is an application for employment in the US armed forces. Presumably the body of the dissent explains what this is meant to prove, although I doubt I would feel myself enlightened for the effort of going back and finding that exegesis.