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Re:Fuchsia overview by zozbot234 on Saturday May 30, 2020 @06:12PM (#23365241)
"Isolation" of driver code that can talk to on-SoC hardware is just not very meaningful. You can only have real driver isolation if it's enforced on the hardware side via some IOMMU mechanism (or by keeping the hardware isolated on the USB bus, etc.), otherwise you're just adding pointless overhead for no real benefit.
Re:Fuchsia overview by goodthenandnow on Tuesday June 09, 2020 @06:59PM (#23471898)
Re:Fuchsia overview by entha_saava on Saturday May 30, 2020 @10:01PM (#23366574)
I didn't get it. Don't we want, for example, wifi driver not to be able to access and corrupt (due to some bug) GPU driver's memory?
Re:Fuchsia overview by exged on Saturday May 30, 2020 @11:52PM (#23367040)
It's desirable, but typically hardware devices have DMA-capable buses that can read / write to arbitrary physical memory. So a buggy or malicious WiFi driver may be able to use the WiFi DMA hardware to write into the GPU driver's memory, and no pure software mechanism can stop it from doing so.

IOMMUs solve this problem by giving hardware devices their own virtual address spaces.

Re:Fuchsia overview by michaelmrose on Saturday May 30, 2020 @11:05PM (#23366822)
Does this actually happen?
Re:Fuchsia overview by gigatexal on Sunday May 31, 2020 @12:16AM (#23367130)
I’m sure it does when used to exploit devices.