It does not. It blocks all outgoing connections to TCP/UDP 53 and 80. There's no such thing as port 80 UDP HTTP traffic (there is QUIC, which uses TLS by default; your rules would block it by default), and HTTP traffic can be received over a different port than 80 TCP. Your example of NTP is also wrong, as it uses 123 UDP; not TCP. Furthermore, if someone were to skew the clock too much, your average NTP client does not accept such.
This stops only very archaic malware. I guess a poor man's NIDS.
BTW: You can nuke NTP requests by doing:
sudo ufw deny out to any port 123But he does trust cloudflare for his DNS requests.
Cloudflare run NTP, so just use their server.
The only threat I can see is if someone intercepts his NTP traffic, but they could intercept the DNS traffic too and see his SYNs (and indeed pass them on with you not even noticing)
His concern seems to be more about the IP leaking rather than the NTP result being incorrect, however in the latter case then yes, NTP isn't signed, so it's possible for someone to skew your clock by a few seconds if they were to intercept your traffic to all your NTP servers.
This ensures no plaintext http can be sniffed, nor plaintext DNS queries. Then you can just configure DoH in your browser to get DNS functionality back, (in encrypted form usually over port 443).
Doing that depends on your threat model though.