This is mainly taking place in Linux distros at the moment, bit Fdroid is doing something related on Android, building all the apps they host on their own infrastructure.
There is really no way around that.
As for "messing it up on developer machine" - that's not really possibly if the build is really reproducible. If the users get the same binary after building the source, they can be sure they have the source matching the binary.
If the binary they get is different from what the developer built on their machine, there is a good chance they don't have the source matching the binary, which is exactly what reproducible builds aims to protect them from.
That means that some commonly-used practices like embedding current timestamps into files become unacceptable.
It does tighten the development constraints -- although frankly, that's similar to many other secure coding practices. Better tooling, linting and frameworks will help to reduce the developer friction.
Indeed, a lot of the stuff you need to do to achieve reproducible builds can definitely make your build process more robust and secire.
iOS is a little harder. If you have the dsym files it’s pretty trivial to the same exercise as Android. NHSX could choose to release them so people could again verify it more or less matches.
Folks could see builds running when code is pushed and the app versions being released soon after.
How would a scheme work, that (within the confines of the current App Store regime) allowed users to verify the source code look? Could Apple/Google maybe hash every file as part of the compilation/linking process, and then concatenate that in some way and include it in the signed binary and expose it in the App Store?
It would be really neat with some process where I can clone a repo on my machine, run some script and get an identifier, and verify that it is the same as what is being shown in the App Store on my device.