Re:Using the NFC Chip of the Passport to Do Proof-of-Work
by tialaramex on Monday May 04, 2020 @09:09PM
(#23075285)
Aha! I read further, Active Authentication is also disliked because the exact feature this blog post relies on prevents deniability - and that's a Privacy no-no, so some countries like Germany explicitly do not want it.
With Active Authentication you can basically show the passport a nonce, and get the passport to give you signed proof that it saw this nonce. As a result you can show other people that nonce, and the signature, and they know it was a real passport.
But alternative schemes avoid this, you and the passport perform a dance in which either the passport is genuine and you get the answer you expected, or it isn't and you don't, but you don't get a durable proof you can show to anybody else as output.
This latter scheme works more like a physical document while also defeating cheap "clone" attempts and so privacy-friendly countries have no reason to use Active Authentication.
With Active Authentication you can basically show the passport a nonce, and get the passport to give you signed proof that it saw this nonce. As a result you can show other people that nonce, and the signature, and they know it was a real passport.
But alternative schemes avoid this, you and the passport perform a dance in which either the passport is genuine and you get the answer you expected, or it isn't and you don't, but you don't get a durable proof you can show to anybody else as output.
This latter scheme works more like a physical document while also defeating cheap "clone" attempts and so privacy-friendly countries have no reason to use Active Authentication.