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Re:Using the NFC Chip of the Passport to Do Proof-of-Work by tialaramex on Monday May 04, 2020 @08:21PM (#23074961)
The feature this talks about isn't free, it requires a bunch more compute capability in the NFC chip, which drives up prices and you most likely wouldn't know if you have it. What's the result?

Passports are expensive documents, but what you'd expect is that even though the document is expensive anyway there's an incentive to cut corner on expensive features that aren't noticed.

Sure enough my actual British passport (issued after it became apparent that idiot Leavers would get their way but before they wasted money having the passports arbitrarily changed colour and removing the words "European Union") does not have the "Active Authentication" feature.

It has the obligatory embarrassing photo encoded, and it carries proof this document was issued by the UKPA, for whatever that is worth, but it isn't capable of "active authentication" and so it would be useless for this PoW trick.

Now maybe the United Kingdom is an outlier. Maybe every other passport authority in the world has been issuing these for a decade. But I'd guess exactly the opposite. One or two security enthusiastic countries have it, or worse, it's available as a demo from the handful of companies that make passports, but the vast majority of people who have a passport don't have one of these.

If you own an NFC reader you can get software that checks for Active Authentication. I'd be a tiny bit interested in the results if you see anything interesting for yours.

Re:Using the NFC Chip of the Passport to Do Proof-of-Work by tialaramex on Monday May 04, 2020 @09:09PM (#23075285)
Aha! I read further, Active Authentication is also disliked because the exact feature this blog post relies on prevents deniability - and that's a Privacy no-no, so some countries like Germany explicitly do not want it.

With Active Authentication you can basically show the passport a nonce, and get the passport to give you signed proof that it saw this nonce. As a result you can show other people that nonce, and the signature, and they know it was a real passport.

But alternative schemes avoid this, you and the passport perform a dance in which either the passport is genuine and you get the answer you expected, or it isn't and you don't, but you don't get a durable proof you can show to anybody else as output.

This latter scheme works more like a physical document while also defeating cheap "clone" attempts and so privacy-friendly countries have no reason to use Active Authentication.