Well, or employers think people drop out due to poor grades.
Three years of 4.0 GPA then dropping out due to pregnancy and three years of 1.0 GPA then dropping out before your expulsion hearing for cheating both put "3 years of college" on your resume.
I seem to observe that now many companies generally want to pick the already-developed crop of people who fit the bill to a T, have had education or previous employment do the job of training / filtering who to consider, and not engage in the training part of it much any more.
Maybe it's due to the increasing cost of hiring people that you must only take a chance on a sure bet, and that there is less and less appetite (financial return-wise) to spend money on training people who are just as likely to pick up and leave for another company.
... perhaps put another way, the 'professionalization' of HR?
For various reasons, on both the employer and employee side, this has changed a lot especially when you're talking startups--but also companies like Amazon from what I understand. In any case, if the expected tenure of an employee is only a couple of years, it's probably unreasonable in most cases to have a 6-12 month training period during which the employee isn't especially productive.
That’s close to actual job requirements in a lot of places.
It’s similar to closing a house sale. The money earned by brokers who get the buyer to sign the contract is exponentially more than the money earned by the brokers who only get 90% of the way there.
That doesn’t mean that the value of the initial 90% of the work is 0.
Of course, this is an extreme example for illustration purposes, because real estate is a step function where the returns go from 0 to 100 at a single point.
The exponentially higher earnings of grads can similarly be explained as a step function where earnings go from 50 to 100 after a certain event. And it’s not even that surprising, because the event in question is completing the thing that you actually stepped out to do.
I think that ties in to the proliferation of higher degrees, where college is not a strong enough signal so students go on to receive higher degrees that signal more time, money and investment has been spent
> Suppose your law firm wants a summer associate. A law student with a doctorate in philosophy from Stanford applies. What do you infer? The applicant is probably brilliant, diligent, and willing to tolerate serious boredom. If you’re looking for that kind of worker—and what employer isn’t?—you’ll make an offer, knowing full well that nothing the philosopher learned at Stanford will be relevant to this job.
If the value of education was the information taught in the classes or the network, you should see a somewhat linear increase of value as you progress. For instance, after completing your second year out of four, you should receive ~50% of the college premium.
> Most of the salary payoff for college comes from crossing the graduation finish line. Suppose you drop out after a year. You’ll receive a salary bump compared with someone who’s attended no college, but it won’t be anywhere near 25 percent of the salary premium you’d get for a four-year degree. Similarly, the premium for sophomore year is nowhere near 50 percent of the return on a bachelor’s degree, and the premium for junior year is nowhere near 75 percent of that return. Indeed, in the average study, senior year of college brings more than twice the pay increase of freshman, sophomore, and junior years combined. Unless colleges delay job training until the very end, signaling is practically the only explanation
[0] https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/whats-c...