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Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by blibble on Sunday May 03, 2020 @11:54PM (#23064403)
> So, for the simple act of logging in, three mechanisms are required (systemd, /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd). This is inefficient, and Poettering has decided to make a drastic change. That change is homed. With homed, all information will be placed in a cryptographically signed JSON record for each user.

10 years ago this would have been considered satire

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by kuschku on Monday May 04, 2020 @05:37AM (#23066074)
homed is a purely optional, independent tool, for use in situations where you’d use roaming home directories on windows, or similar technology.

No one is forcing you to change your broken buggy 30-year old shell scripts, you can always continue using them.

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by throw0101a on Monday May 04, 2020 @11:24AM (#23069123)
> No one is forcing you to change your broken buggy 30-year old shell scripts, you can always continue using them.

How about usernames that start with a digit? Am I still allowed to use those?

* https://ma.ttias.be/giving-perspective-systemds-usernames-st...

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by kuschku on Wednesday May 06, 2020 @01:29PM (#23093829)
POSIX says that any tool should always translate usernames into userids at the earliest possible point, and pass UIDs to children it spawns.

Now assuming I have a user called 1000 with UID 2000, and a user called 2000 with UID 1000.

Now what do you think is gonna happen if multiple POSIX-compliant tools call each other?

This is clearly broken, and the reason why BSDs don’t actually implement POSIX cleanly, instead allowing all their tools to take unambiguous identifiers on the CLI, with the # prefix to mark a UID, and have all their tools call all their children with this format.

The POSIX standard is clearly suboptimal here, and the set of valid usernames, and the set of valid UIDs should never have been allowed to overlap.

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by throw0101a on Friday May 08, 2020 @01:26PM (#23117216)
The weblog post has an user called '0day', i.e., "zero day". This breaks systemd as outlined in the post. This is a WONTFIX per the systemd folks.
Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by kuschku on Friday May 08, 2020 @02:55PM (#23118138)
That’s one of the possible options, the other would be replacing chown, chmod, ls, etc (as the BSDs do)
Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by jcynix on Monday May 04, 2020 @03:34AM (#23065446)
This must be satire, not? Because soon my .forward won't work, my .procmailrc won't work, my crontab scripts won't (etc pp) unless my encrypted home directory (planned to be decrypted on login) is decrypted. Or all these are moved to other locations.
Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by vidarh on Monday May 04, 2020 @05:49AM (#23066158)
Or you opt to not encrypt your home separately.

But how large a proportion of machines do you think have mail delivery rely on .forward or .procmailrc in $HOME these days?

In any case, procmail can be executed directly rather than from .forward in most cases, and can be configured to take the rc file to be a file in /etc/procmail-rcs/ as an alternative to $HOME/.procmailrc (at least the version of procmail in Ubuntu; unlike /etc/procmailrc, the files in /etc/procmail-rcs/ will take on the user id of the user the file is named for, like $HOME/.procmailrc).

User crontabs on my system at least (Ubuntu) are in /var/spool/cron/crontabs/[username], not in $HOME anyway. I can't remember the last system I had with user crontabs in $HOME.

People have had systems where relying on accessing the home directory of a logged out user has been undesirable or impossible for a very long time.

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by throw0101a on Monday May 04, 2020 @11:29AM (#23069181)
> But how large a proportion of machines do you think have mail delivery rely on .forward or .procmailrc in $HOME these days?

I help run a 500 node HPC cluster that leverages procmail. Do I count?

> User crontabs on my system at least (Ubuntu) are in /var/spool/cron/crontabs/[username], not in $HOME anyway.

The crontab(5) may be there, but where is the script that is actually executed? Probably in $HOME/scripts/ or some such.

> People have had systems where relying on accessing the home directory of a logged out user has been undesirable or impossible for a very long time.

I have daily experiences indicating otherwise. I would hazard to guess that many other syadins in academia & research would agree. Even assuming $HOME is in /home breaks a bunch of stuff:

* https://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/linux/Ubuntu2004Sna...

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by vidarh on Monday May 04, 2020 @12:36PM (#23070119)
> I help run a 500 node HPC cluster that leverages procmail. Do I count?

You do, but you're a tiny minority, and as noted /etc/procmail-rcs/ provides an alternative to putting them in /home. If that doesn't work for you, all you need is to not configure encrypted home directions and nothing changes.

> The crontab(5) may be there, but where is the script that is actually executed? Probably in $HOME/scripts/ or some such.

So don't configure encrypted home directories, then. Nobody is forcing you to enable it. Or you can provide an alternative location, and let your users protect their data better and still be able to use cron jobs. It does not take any flexibility away from you, but it adds capabilities for those who want them.

> I have daily experiences indicating otherwise. I would hazard to guess that many other syadins in academia & research would agree. Even assuming $HOME is in /home breaks a bunch of stuff:

Your experiences with systems that are fine with accessing $HOME does not mean that there aren't plenty of systems where it has been an issue, hence why plenty of software supports alternatives.

Your point of not assuming $HOME is in /home is irrelevant to this issue. The point is that software have had to deal with a subset of users with setups where a users home directory is not necessarily accessible when the user is not logged in for many years. As such most software has options to avoid relying on a users home directory being present already, which reduces this to a relatively simple choice of whether or not you consider the ability to encrypt home directories to be worth making those changes for.

Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by jcynix on Monday May 04, 2020 @09:36AM (#23067863)
Maybe my point wasn't stated clear enough: the crontab itself is in spool, obviously, but the scripts started from crontab entries reside in my home directory. And while a procmailrc can live in some spool too, the files to be delivered into are in my home directory too.
Re:Systemd, ten years later: a historical and technical retr... by vidarh on Monday May 04, 2020 @12:37PM (#23070137)
So then you have two choices: Move them elsewhere, and be able to encrypt the rest of $HOME, or don't encrypt $HOME. This gives you additional options for protecting your home directory if you want it. Noone is forcing you.