"a computer simulation"
"a universe simulation"
"an ancestor simulation in which the lived experience is indistinguishable from our current experience, which necessarily won't be able to simulate the entire universe nor anything at a high level of fidelity and so requires constant tricks to convince the inhabitants things are real"
The last one is required for this argument to work and I think that's what's being slipped in. Sure, everybody loves computer simulations. We run them all the time. Video games are computer simulations, so look at that. We all love them.
We're talking about a very, very specific type of simulation and the more specific you define it, the less likely it is anyone will ever build one.
"Sensory deprivation tank" isn't absurd. That seems to be what we're talking about here. I suppose I will have to read the book because the noise argument you are presenting seems bizarre to me. Do you think your lived experience can be characterized as sensory noise? I absolutely do not understand how you can just simulate minds without an environment unless we are talking about dreams or hallucination.
I don't think scaling down the fidelity in certain places works. Humans expect natural processes to occur even when they're not looking. The evidence will be there long afterwards. There is no particular place that we wouldn't look for such evidence.
>Furthermore, such an advanced simulation would have knowledge of what its simulated objects are, rather than the constitution of their matter requiring a simulation of its physics.
No I don't think so. The number of possible "simulated objects" is infinite. Even the most advanced simulation you imagine would not be written in such a way to account for them.
>Advanced humans with knowledge of what algorithms constitute a human mind would simply need to track the inferences minds make in order to avoid seeing through the simulation.
Not convinced on this point either, but anyway this would conflict with reality considering a great many people already believe with certainty that they are living in a simulation.
No tricks. Simulating the minds is the entire point. Simulating physics isn't the interesting part of these kinds of simulations.
> I absolutely do not understand how you can just simulate minds without an environment
Each simulated mind contains a set of beliefs about the local environment. The intersection of the belief-sets of the people in close physical proximity dictates the local reality. If some belief-sets conflict, choose the set that has more believers.
Global consistency can be assured if all beliefs that survive a conflict satisfy certain conditions.
> I suppose I will have to read the book because the noise argument you are presenting seems bizarre to me.
You don't need to simulate the LHC, you only need to simulate what outputs the scientists believe the LHC should produce, ie. they expect results consistent with the statistical models of quantum mechanics. Introduce some random errors here and there as a demonstration of human fallibility (like the FTL neutrinos mistake a few years back due to a loose cable).
> No I don't think so. The number of possible "simulated objects" is infinite
The number at any given time is not. Every simulated object will have logical properties associated with it, particularly at its interface. Satisfy the logical properties of the interface, and a simulated mind wouldn't know the difference.
> Not convinced on this point either, but anyway this would conflict with reality considering a great many people already believe with certainty that they are living in a simulation.
They may believe it but they can never prove it, and so they're not actually seeing through the simulation.
It's well documented that the human brain ignores or fills in inputs for things that mostly match its expectations. You're already ignoring vast swaths of your sensory input at this very moment by focusing on this text.
A simulation of a world of minds, rather than a simulation of its physics, would be many orders of magnitude more feasible because the simulation itself would have knowledge of each mind's sensory input. Therefore, it would know exactly how much fidelity it needed at any given moment, and where.
Furthermore, such an advanced simulation would have knowledge of what its simulated objects are, rather than the constitution of their matter requiring a simulation of its physics. This merely requires a simulation of the interface with the outputs having the right kind of noise. You wave this away via some absurd "sensory deprivation" remark, but this is explicitly the possibility discussed in the Simulation hypothesis.
Whatever science simulated people do, they simply cannot violate the simulation parameters. Advanced humans with knowledge of what algorithms constitute a human mind would simply need to track the inferences minds make in order to avoid seeing through the simulation.
And I don't find your analysis of Bostrom's argument complete. His argument is airtight:
1. Simulations cannot be built: simulations are impossible, advanced civilizations go extinct before they're built, etc.
2. Simulations will not be built: future humans have no interest in ancestor simulations, they have ethical qualms against doing so, etc.
3. We are almost certainly in a simulation: the number of simulated people far outnumber the number of non-simulated people, so you are likely a simulation.
You simply can't be unconvinced by this argument.