"I'm not wrong, I'm just early"... "IT'S THE SAME THING!"
The story obviously works out well for them in the end. But all it would have taken was the market to hold out just a little longer or investors wanting enough of their money back just a little earlier and they would have all taken a bath.
The markets are littered with stories of things that don't make sense, I semi-regularly get motivated to actually put my money where my mouth is. And in the vast majority of cases I end up getting the timing wrong by a month or two, which in the end is still just getting it wrong. There's no reward for being just a little bit wrong. It's also not realistic to look back at historical events and think you'd have been able to predict the timing with the required accuracy if only you had the data.
Even in the big short, they show the routes different traders took to get short exposure and all took various amounts of heat until it payed off.
Same is true now wrt to corporate bonds (or I should say was true, way more expensive now to short than it was say during the entire time of 2019), one know's they will go tits up, but getting the cheapest exposure will enable to either build the position with minimal/fixed draw down or sweat every bps move against you.
Finally in 2008, these guys booked like $100 million in profits. But it didn’t matter at all cause the dealer side lost $50 billion.
I thought that was one of the most interesting / exciting parts of the book.
The fact that they literally had to go and find people who would sell them insurance on the mortgage backed securities.
More specifically: glacially.
Up until the credit markets froze up, all the information was available, with time to digest and for anyone to act on it.
That's the most interesting thing about this presentation. I'm assuming this or similar was the one dramatized in The Big Short?
It's simply saying that something doesn't add up. Then laying out its case for the numbers that were added.
At a macro level, there isn't much complexity:
(1) Home price appreciation is strongly inversely correlated with default rate.
(2) CDO are created with sharp risk cliffs related to systemic default rate.
(3) Current home price appreciation + observed default rate + CDO pricing does not add up. Ergo, one of those things must be wrong.