You can't use the stuff you linked with TLS 1.3, and of course you can't use an older TLS version in QUIC. It's possible you knew those things, but I want to make sure.

My recent experience with the password manager that was linked on HN shows me that even an abuse-resistant API like Sodium cannot stop people being idiots. (The author believs some random passwords aren't "unique enough" so they have written a bunch of code on top of Sodium to avoid passwords like '4K2m_chmJ$gD' which they feel wouldn't be suitable because it has the letter 'm' more than once...)

I hadn't checked compatibility and wasn't aware they no longer included SRP. It's not the best PAKE, but to my knowledge, not cryptographically broken (Apple uses it for a bunch of stuff, IIRC). Thanks for letting me know.

And you're right, that's pretty dopey with the password manager. I understand the point of password security measures, but just do something like pam cracklib. There's no such thing as an idiot-proof library. Honestly, that looks like the developer was being kind of lazy, using a constant size for things like max password length.

My only point here is that there are libraries that are well-tested, secure, and at least as idiot-proof as openssl. The increased ability to do the protocol wrong with something like libsodium is balanced by the increased ability to do the crypto wrong with something like openssl.

They didn't explicitly deprecate TLS-SRP, it simply can't work in TLS 1.3 because although it superficially looks like a minor revision, and indeed (to defeat middlebox ossification) on the wire it appears to say it is only TLS 1.2 in reality it's a fairly radical change.

TLS-SRP bolts over the traditional TLS key exchange mechanism, which made sense, but in TLS 1.3 that entire mechanism is gone, keys are either pre-shared or they're always agreed in the first protocol burst using an (elliptic curve) Diffie Hellman method. So by the time you'd have a natural opportunity to do SRP the protocol has already agreed keys anyway.