Also, the way this is written is sounds like system isolates this DLL into its own AppContainer separate from specific apps that use/rely on it (and I guess remote to it)?
- The AppContainers thing sounds like it directly refers to the Panes in Explorer referenced, and it sounds like it is Explorer creating the sandboxes, so they wouldn't bubble out of the Pane, so it probably is correct that versions of Windows 10 doing that don't have a lot to worry about that as an exploit vector. That probably doesn't apply to other possible vectors such as evil PDFs/Word Documents, though those generally have warnings for PostScript fonts at this point. (I glossed over the Panes as the concern for the idea it might be running in the Explorer process. Their an "extension point", so Explorer moving them into sandboxes sound like exactly what it should have done, and not surprising is what it is doing.)
- DirectWrite is considered to have parts forked, but entirely independent, from ATMFD. Some CVEs have been caught that also impacted (lightly) DirectWrite, but this doesn't sound like one.
It's a sandboxing method, and atmfd was moved into a sandbox to reduce the risk of people exploiting bugs in it. At this point it is clear that sandboxing it was worth the effort.
Before then, this ATMFD code was only in the kernel, making it a useful vector for privilege escalation.
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=13... (description of an old ATMFD bug) explains it:
"Windows 10 has a sandboxed user-mode font driver (fontdrvhost.exe) that doesn't have access to any sensitive information and will cleanly restart upon crashing."
https://census-labs.com/media/windows_10_rs2_rs3_exploitatio... has some more detail on how this process is further hardened with syscall filtering, if I recall correctly this was introduced in Windows 10 1709:
"Privilege escalation exploits are on the rise, because of sandboxes. The Win32k component, a provider of system calls, has introduced win32kfilter, a filtering mechanism that cuts down the number of system calls available to sandboxed processes (thus reducing the kernel's attack surface). FontDrvHost.exe, which is the font parser, uses the 3rd level of win32kfilter."