Most apps could probably live happily with there being an entitlement for ‘unsecured clipboard access’ to enable anything but text into a text field.
The key is that apps shouldn't have silent, arbitrary clipboard access. The user should have to do an action for the clipboard's contents to be transferred. The only way to prevent abuse is for a system-provided widget to be the one making the actual API call.
Another option would be to provide apps an API call that opens a system "paste dialog", asking the user, "Paste X into this app?". This would have the added bonus of giving the user a preview of what they have in their clipboard before actually performing the paste. It could even show a history of the last several copied items in case they want to paste one of those instead, which would be a genuine productivity-booster.
Complicated buffer access would require an "allow" dialog.
I am probably oversimplifying things.
2. When using 2FA, 1Password will automatically write your one time code to the clipboard so it can easily be pasted. As a convenience, after 45 seconds or so it restores your previous clipboard contents for you. To do this it has to be able to read them.
3. An OCR app has a "OCR from clipboard" button to extract text from the image currently in the clipboard.
- Apps can and should let the user paste it themselves. (Examples #1 and #3 offer only slight convenience at the cost of user privacy and security.)
Some apps do little UX tricks like a parcel tracker app that I have would prompt saving a new parcel if it detects a tracking number in the clipboard.
Same as the last one; one of my banking apps detect IBAN numbers in clipboard, offer to initiate a wire directly.
I believe the photo picker has had a similar evolution. In the early days of iPhone OS apps used the system-default photo picker, and nowadays it's for apps to use that in favor of reimplementing.