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Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by mirekrusin on Friday March 06, 2020 @05:16AM (#22502413)
Great article but if I wanted to explain it to somebody in one sentence I'd say "It's like sign-in with google, but for enterprises", by "enterprises" i mean "more shit" - xml/soap/overcomplicated kind of shit.
Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by sascha_sl on Friday March 06, 2020 @05:23AM (#22502448)
as the resident keeper of the keycloak (aka RedHat SSO) which can and does do both SAML and OIDC (what google uses) in our organization I only sort of agree. SAML is overcomplicated, but OIDC also has a lot of bloat, although it's more optional there. It's just trying to solve too many problems for too many parties at once. Back and front channel logout, your choice of symmetric or asymmetric crypto, at least 3 types of different tokens, and 3 ways to get subsets of them with various subtypes, depending on if you're a client application, a web application that can redirect, a web application that can't redirect, an app on a TV... Oh, and did I tell you about the authorization framework? With assessment servers? There's that too!

Thankfully in the real world both seem to be implemented in the absolute minimal way to get things working.

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by Edmond on Friday March 06, 2020 @08:52AM (#22503486)
Cheers for keycloak, title pun intended :)

We use it for Solvent (https://codesolvent.com) login to product instances and it works excellently.

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by i_haz_rabies on Friday March 06, 2020 @09:56AM (#22504006)
How have you guys solved "from scratch" configuration for keycloak? I've worked with it a bit over the years and I've never found a way to get it into a state I want programmatically without hacky bash scripts and modifying the json templates.
Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by Edmond on Friday March 06, 2020 @10:42AM (#22504405)
Maybe we got lucky with the configuration but we use the approach documented for the keycloak-saml-adapter with Jetty as the app server.

There is still a lot work done to ensure keys are generated in the proper locations and that necessary product id values (corresponds to SAML SP entityID) are generated.

In short, it is not a simple plug-n-play, lots of hacking to get the result we needed but the adapter itself does what it needs to do.

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by sascha_sl on Friday March 06, 2020 @02:38PM (#22506540)
believe it or not, but we do FROM jboss/keycloak:9.0.0, add a theme jar, throw it on k8s with 2 pods and a postgres behind it and that's it.

Our clients are mostly SAML SaaS software and our own implementation of gatekeeper (which is also a kubernetes ingress) with short lifetime OIDC ID tokens, long lifetime refresh tokens and seamless background refreshing.

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by swiley on Friday March 06, 2020 @08:49AM (#22503468)
So much easier than SSO would be installing certs on all the client machines when they’re provisioned. Support for client side certs on iOS sucks balls of course so no one does this.
Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by lvh on Friday March 06, 2020 @09:00AM (#22503562)
I love mTLS a lot more than the average bear[0], but the main reason I see companies deploy SSO is centralized access control and access management (particularly for offboarding), which client certs are only a tiny fraction of. Since they're typically long-held, you're now proposing either a rigorous revocation scheme or continuous reissuance, and neither seems to be deployed anywhere outside of maybe the DoD. (And Gemini? Maybe?) So: as much as I'd love that to be the case, I don't think that we're "iOS' UX for client certs" away from that being a plausible replacement.

[0]: Thomas Pornin is far from average!

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by admax88q on Friday March 06, 2020 @11:18AM (#22504757)
It really shouldn't be any more work to revoke a certificate or just maintain a whitelist/blacklist of certificates than it should be to just disable a user account.

Certificates are only more difficult because nobody seems to have put in the effort to automate them, and client software hasn't put in any effort to make the experience nice.

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by lvh on Friday March 06, 2020 @11:38AM (#22504927)
Even if we stipulate that's true: that's precisely my point, nobody has built the tooling to make any of it good, but companies need a reasonable access control story today.
Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by swiley on Friday March 06, 2020 @09:02AM (#22503586)
Why are the people who left taking corporate devices with them?

Or alternatively, why are you trusting new employees phones? That’s absolute insanity.

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by lvh on Friday March 06, 2020 @09:10AM (#22503654)
They don't need to take a corporate device with them. They need to have exfiltrated a credential during the (long) time they had alone with the laptop. You trust new employees' phones the way you decided to trust anything else: a risk assessment based on what the company is willing to bear, taking into account compensating controls like MDM.

Are you suggesting "no creds that live outside of trusted elements physically tied to a device we own" is an ubiquitous property of access management?

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by swiley on Friday March 06, 2020 @07:30PM (#22508754)
> no creds that live outside of trusted elements physically tied to a device we own.

I’ve never worked full time at a software company that allowed credentials on employee personal devices. Supposedly because most consumers are up to their eyes in malware, often from the moment they buy the devices, not because the employees are untrustworthy (it would be difficult to have a functioning business where you can’t trust the employees.)

Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by throwaway3157 on Friday March 06, 2020 @09:55PM (#22509411)
I’m currently typing on a personal mobile device that is trusted by my software employer
Re:Beer Drinkers Guide to SAML by lvh on Friday March 06, 2020 @11:01PM (#22509647)
You don't appear to have engaged with my core point: policy is not access control.