This is less of a problem when each message also generates a random key, but still annoying to contend with.
XChaCha20-Poly1305 lets you generate 2^96 messages before having to worry about rekeying. https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/secret-key_cryptography/aea...
That's enough that you can generate 1000 messages a second for several millenia.
You'd want a probability more like 1-in-a-million (or 1-in-a-billion). That's 2^39 (or 2^34), which is 1000 messages a second for 17 years (or 7 months).
Again, probably still safe for many use cases. But you do have to think about it for a second. XChaCha20's 192-bit nonce capacity lets you totally ignore that factor, which is a nice property for generic crypto recommendations.
Generally speaking leaking that two plaintexts are the same is better than leaking two plaintexts XORed together. If you’re in a use case where that’s liable to happen (i.e., you don’t rekey “frequently”) I’d happily take the former leaked bit over the latter leaked messages.
There are also a handful of existing constructions you can just take off the shelf rather than rolling your own thing and getting it wrong.
With AES-GCM, if you reuse a nonce with two different plaintexts, you reveal the XOR of the two plaintexts!
> This code avoids some of the numerous pitfalls that you can encounter when constructing encryption schemes yourself. For example, it ensures that you use a randomly selected nonce, and that you authenticate your ciphertext.
The AES-GCM nonce is only 96 bits, which might be enough in many contexts, but is still a little short for comfort when selecting nonces randomly: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/05/14/aesgcmsiv.html
It's surprising that the blog post just declared success without bringing this up at all.
(It looks like AES.GCM.seal does let you specify the nonce, though, in cases where you can maintain a counter yourself.)