[1]https://news.bitcoin.com/how-to-obscure-bitcoin-cash-transac... [2]https://medium.com/@tornado.cash/introducing-private-transac...
with cashfusion not even the server owners know which transactions belong to who, which isnt the case with normal mixers[1].
[1]https://medium.com/@james.waugh28/is-cashfusion-really-anony...
Traceability doesn't need to be a problem.
Steal enough banknotes and the bank will go to great lengths to find you. The Northern Bank robbery stole a significant fraction of all NB notes in circulation, so the bank re-issued them, relying on the impossibility of the criminals laundering them before the swap deadline.
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/the...
As such, traceability will remain a risk for anyone receiving cryptocurrency payments. If a chain analysis reveals an illegal transaction as a precursor, it's going to be considered stolen goods, not money, as the article states.
That's fine, but if the governments don't take action it'll be up for the courts to decide that.
>it's going to be considered stolen goods, not money, as the article states.
This is not at all obvious. It's not even clear that the nemo dat rule would apply to any kind of ransom payment.
The governments don't need to do this, the courts do. There's an existing principle they could very cleanly apply here.
Yes it's a little different from the problem described in the post, but it's another facet of the fungibility issue.
The same way they could decide to ban Monero... seems like what you describe with z-cash is more complex to support in an exchange than simply removing a whole cryptocurrency, thus is less likely to happen.
The only cryptocurrency that comes close to solving this is Monero, which isn't traceable.
If the attackers were smart, this is what they would've done: Send them to Bitfinex, which is an unregulated and shady exchange, sell them for Monero and withdraw them immediately. Congratulations, now you have a bunch of untraceable cryptocurrency.