Also, what makes you think that what goes on in your own brain isn't just another form of "brute-forcing"? What makes one implementation of thinking "thinking" and another form just "brute-force"? And then, brute-forcing is the technique of trying every possible solution - a Turing Machine must be able to move in a near infinite solution space, so brute-forcing is not actually possible.
The answer to insight into a system's qualia is not a Turing test:
Watson, tell us, do you feel fear? Crunching through some look-up tables Yes!
What did that prove about Watson feeling fear or not? We could have Alice talking with Watson for hours on end about fear and daddy issues, without them even knowing the taste of fruit.
That is why the Turing test is an incomplete test for human-like machine intelligence. You seem to equate feigning intelligence, with possessing intelligence. Feigning fear with possessing fear.
Also, where on Earth do I equate feigning intelligence with possessing intelligence. You're just making that up.
I'm sure the question was asked: Can machines think? But passing the Turing Test doesn't answer this question. It answers a different question: What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game? Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman?
Its up to you if you take an affirmative answer to those questions to also answer the question it replaces: "Can machines think?" The imitation game does not aim to proof anything to this point. It aims to support its replacement questions, which we have to take at face value: that imitation is just as good (for all sense and purposes) as the real thing.
Also, you write: >And how will we know that Watson actually feels fear? The answer to this type of conundrum is simple and well-known: a Turing test.
If I make a chatscript that tricks you into thinking it was a person feeling fear, by your own logic, you would deem that chatscript to be thinking and actually capable of intelligent conversation, even if you were told afterward it was just some lines of code, feigning you with a (if input, output: yes), it still passed the test, so your answer is: those binary bits must feel fear (or you agree that you apply the Turing Test where it makes no sense).
What entities are really feeling and how to communicate this, has no simple known answer. There have been century-old debates about Qualia. The answer certainly isn't an imitation game, if you insist it is, you are equating feigning with truly possessing. (Or you are suggesting I am a P-zombie and I take offense to that!)
If your chatscript can negotiate this type of test, then it would satisfy me that it was thinking.
If you can have an interview with a computer, and an interview with a human, and be unable to determine which is which (accurately, over several trials), how can you argue that the computer isn't human-like? Most versions of the test have ways of eliminating everything but the straight communication of information (because whether you can build a convincing robot or amazing TTS software is a different problem).
How do you know that I'm not a computer?
There's also no guarantee we wouldn't be able to brute force it in time, just as deep blue was mere brute forcing. Impressive technologically, disappointing intellectually.
When I think of intelligence I think of intuition, creativity, flexibility and the ability to learn. The turing test is a simple test along a long path.
I don't think the answer of your conundrum is simple and well known.