Like retail stores with 8 employees on, where some are meant to handle stock and some are meant to serve customers, but you've given them all sales budgets for the day. The stock doesn't get handled, and you have 8 people not meeting their budgets. All the employees are unhappy about that, stressed, and working against eachother to try to succeed.
Competitive metrics just makes it so you have a handful of "star" people, who are great at undermining their colleagues in order to meet their own budget. Rather than an effective team of good people. So in the example, by the metrics, you have 1 good employee and 7 bad ones, no one is happy, your processes have fallen apart and your team doesn't work effectively together. The only people who get fired are the employees, yet the store continues to underperform.
The reported target in the 737 MAX case was that Boeing had promised Southwest a $1 million penalty per plane if retraining was required.
So both Boeing and Southwest created a perverse incentive to make the plane less safe. One or two airline accidents can close an airline, so I guarantee nobody at Southwest really wanted to make that deal in retrospect.
Although Southwest didn't have any 737 MAX accidents and they paid for the deluxe MCAS instrument package, they were horrified to find out that what was delivered, what it was supposed to do, and what was documented were 3 different things.
Source: commercially-rated pilot, followed MCAS fiasco daily. Search for "simulators" in the following link:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2019/03/28/did-airbu...
In context that's 1-2% of the sale price of a MAX (depending on discounts). It's plausible that retraining drove MCAS, but that seems unlikely to me.
deluxe MCAS instrument package
No such thing exists. The AoA annunciator was supposed to be active on all 737 MAX planes.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=1...
Both planes that crashed didn't have the optional add-on, so ended up not having the Alert either.
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/boein...
That’s one of the reasons why I am against more nuclear plants and running them like other businesses . They will start out doing solid work but over time management will get greedy, reduce quality until something blows up.
However, actual liability is only accrued by those who act on those policies.
It'd be nice to see liability, once determined at a lower level, forced to follow the organization chart back to the root decision. Possibly balanced for something like direct reports.
E.g. you manage 100 people, 20 of them committed fraud, you have a 20/100 share of the crime
Example of it occurring unintentionally:
1. A corporation sets goals for store managers based upon performance metrics that include payroll. These goals are currently realizable by a competent manager without forcing workers to work without pay.
2. Some fraction of managers realize rather than actually working hard to meet the goals, they can get their numbers up by forcing workers to work without pay. This skews the metrics a bit.
3. The most incompetent managers that aren't committing wage-theft are demoted or fired, being replaced with managers that are either more-competent or willing to commit wage-theft.
4. The payroll goal is now adjusted down because the previous accounting-term's payroll average is lower than before.
5. Competent managers manage to get jobs elsewhere, so the fraction of managers willing to commit wage-theft increases.
6. GOTO 2
Eventually the metrics are so skewed that the majority of managers must either commit wage-theft or lose their jobs. These managers are the only people that will get in trouble if the wage-theft is discovered.
> O’Donoghue’s military experience includes 12 years of active duty as a U.S. Marine Corps fighter pilot and test pilot. He flew operational missions in the A-4M, AV-8A and AV-8B Harrier aircraft, and engineering flight tests on the AV-8B and F-14 Tomcat. In 1994, O’Donoghue transferred to the U.S. Air Force Reserve where he flew the C-130, C-141 and C-17. While there he commanded both the 728th Airlift Squadron and the 446 Airlift Wing, stationed at McChord Air Force Base, Wash. In 2005, he retired from the Air Force Reserve at the rank of colonel.
> O’Donoghue holds a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy.
(http://www.boeing.com/company/bios/dennis-odonoghue.page)
This doesn't seem to conform to your theory that it's "cheaper workers" and business majors that caused these problems: sure, they may have created even undue pressure. But it was an all-American fighter jock doing a lot of the actual lying about MCAS.
At what point does some other word become more appropriate?
What you seem to be saying (without actually saying it, so I have to guess) is that, because it's a failure of a group rather than an individual, it isn't ethical any more - it's something else. But if the group structure pushes individuals into unethical actions, isn't the group structure an ethical problem?
Or, for the snarky answer: If companies are corporate persons, then of course they can have ethical issues.
You're going to need overall integrity in addition to ethics, from bottom to top, starting with elements that are known to be lost, or recognized as not being adequate, before you have a chance to make it to the goal again.
Are you saying that a plane that tends to tilt up dangerously under certain conditions that is designed to be pushed down nose first by a software with no limit to how much it'll push down depending on a single sensor would have been an acceptable solution if the workers were different? This is a problem with the design and definition of a large system rather than the implementation.
So, I think in this case, whoever had any knowledge of this at any level and let it go through are absolutely responsible. While outsourcing to cheap labour elsewhere can and often does become a problem,these crashes can't be attributed to that. This was a very specific failure with very specific people in the wrong.
With different engineers and a focus on product versus profit the MAX never would've seen the light of day. With the focus on outsourcing Boeing had a gigantic mess on their hands with the 787 (and 777X) and no resources to focus on getting a 737 replacement to market.
I read this as: engineering ethics were broken because of a toxic management culture.
If we start to put CEOs and majority share owners in prison things will start to shift a bit.
The focus on Boeing and elsewhere has revealed that for a substantial period of time the focus of management was essentially "gutting" the company; replacing highly skilled and expensive engineers and workers with cheaper workers elsewhere and generally removing any impediment to immediate profit - this including stretching to 737 spec to the point that it essentially "broke" rather than taking the cost hit of designing a new plane for a new era.
The thing is, when the paradigm the top puts out is "do whatever it take to make those numbers", you already have an implicitly unethical outlook but one with plausible deniability. The people who push that (whether management, hedge funds or board of directors) are careful not to overtly advocate anything illegal or immoral but it seems logical that when X underling who does Y ethical act is caught and punished, that underling will be replaced by another one who will face the same pressures and quite likely also engage in similar overtly unethical behavior.