Re:The Ethical Failures Behind the Boeing Disasters
by aidenn0 on Thursday December 26, 2019 @07:22PM
(#21888041)
I'm talking about something different from control fraud; particularly in the case that it can arise unintentionally. The fact that it can arise unintentionally makes it much harder to combat because there is built-in plausible deniability.
Example of it occurring unintentionally:
1. A corporation sets goals for store managers based upon performance metrics that include payroll. These goals are currently realizable by a competent manager without forcing workers to work without pay.
2. Some fraction of managers realize rather than actually working hard to meet the goals, they can get their numbers up by forcing workers to work without pay. This skews the metrics a bit.
3. The most incompetent managers that aren't committing wage-theft are demoted or fired, being replaced with managers that are either more-competent or willing to commit wage-theft.
4. The payroll goal is now adjusted down because the previous accounting-term's payroll average is lower than before.
5. Competent managers manage to get jobs elsewhere, so the fraction of managers willing to commit wage-theft increases.
6. GOTO 2
Eventually the metrics are so skewed that the majority of managers must either commit wage-theft or lose their jobs. These managers are the only people that will get in trouble if the wage-theft is discovered.
Example of it occurring unintentionally:
1. A corporation sets goals for store managers based upon performance metrics that include payroll. These goals are currently realizable by a competent manager without forcing workers to work without pay.
2. Some fraction of managers realize rather than actually working hard to meet the goals, they can get their numbers up by forcing workers to work without pay. This skews the metrics a bit.
3. The most incompetent managers that aren't committing wage-theft are demoted or fired, being replaced with managers that are either more-competent or willing to commit wage-theft.
4. The payroll goal is now adjusted down because the previous accounting-term's payroll average is lower than before.
5. Competent managers manage to get jobs elsewhere, so the fraction of managers willing to commit wage-theft increases.
6. GOTO 2
Eventually the metrics are so skewed that the majority of managers must either commit wage-theft or lose their jobs. These managers are the only people that will get in trouble if the wage-theft is discovered.