The 737-Max could not pass 25.173 certification standard. This was the result of larger engines needing to be mounted farther forward due to the constraint of the 737 landing gear.

It was a desire to keep a common type rating that led to the need for MCAS to pass 25.173 because of the landing gear causing an insufficiently (though still positively) longitudinally stable aircraft, not a desire to keep the handling characteristics "similar" to the other 737s, but to keep them legal at all.

1 - https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173

>The 737-Max could not pass 25.173 certification standard. This was the result of larger engines needing to be mounted farther forward due to the constraint of the 737 landing gear.

What I'm suggesting is that if they were to just call it say, the 797 (or whatever), then they could make the handling characteristics different from the 737 and solve the pitching moment problem in a different way that would have been safer.

Yes. They could put the larger engines under a different wing with taller landing gear and call it a 757. ;)

No need. The plane is perfectly flyable without MCAS. It just handles differently to other 737s in parts of the flight envelope.

There is a legal need (to pass 25.173 requirements). The Max doesn't have MCAS because it feels different from another 737; it has MCAS because it feels different from the legal requirement to certify any civilian transport aircraft.

> has MCAS because it feels different from the legal requirement to certify any civilian transport aircraft

Source for that claim?

I’ve read extensively on the topic and have internal Boeing sources and everything I’ve seen says MCAS was needed to maintain the type rating, not that without MCAS the plane wasn’t airworthy.

25.173.a requires the aircraft to meet this section at speeds as low as the minimum speed for steady unstalled flight.

25.173.c requires the stick force curve to have a stable and minimum slope of 1 lbf/6 knots.

At high angles of attack (low speeds), the stick force reduces slightly as compared to lower angles of attack (higher speeds). This requires a negative slope at a point on the stick force curve, violating both the minimum slope and the stable slope requirement of 25.173. (indirect source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-boeings-737-max-failed-1155... ). They couch it as "pushes the nose up" (though the image cited is dual sourced to Boeing and a WSJ graphics author, so I'll wager that "pushes the nose up" is WSJ content rather than Boeing content).

I've never seen the claim regarding 25.173 properly sourced.

Don't know if any of these will satisfy or not, in advance of a final NTSB/FAA/Boeing finalization/post-mortem (I doubt all the internal docs are ever going to come out, of course):

http://newsinflight.com/2019/03/29/what-causes-boeing-737max...

https://abnormaldistribution.org/index.php/2019/04/30/ieee-s...

https://www.quora.com/Does-the-fact-that-the-pilots-of-the-7...

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4286602-boeing-737-max-misc...

They could have if they'd been willing to accept a new type rating, but airlines aren't keen on retraining their 737 pilots unless they have to. Boeing's retention of the same rating was a selling point to airlines otherwise if they're having to train people anyways maybe Airbus would be worth a look?