https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-t...
""" For commonly used 1024-bit keys, it would take about a year and cost a "few hundred million dollars" to crack just one of the extremely large prime numbers that form the starting point of a Diffie-Hellman negotiation. But it turns out that only a few primes are commonly used, putting the price well within the NSA's $11 billion-per-year budget dedicated to "groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities." """
But they're betting one day either a security vulnerability will be discovered, or computers will be fast enough to attack the encryption and allow them to read the data. So even though it's unreadable today, it might be in 10 years.
According to the NSA technical director at the time (2013) the Utah datacenter has a capacity around 5 Zettabytes.
So I looked into that quote from the NSA director. What was actually said, apparently, was that the center was designed to hold up to 5ZB, not that it actually did. That seems to be a design based on some extremely optimistic assumptions about future drive density, power consumption, and cost. Needless to say, those assumptions were a bit silly at the time and have only seemed more so in retrospect.
P.S. It looks like TechCrunch came to almost exactly the same conclusions that I did, for very similar reasons. https://techcrunch.com/2013/07/24/the-nsas-massive-utah-data...
Considering around 100 million hard drives are shipped per quarter, that would be over a decade of production.
Still ridiculous for information that is worth less and less over time.
"SSL added and removed here! :)"