Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in humans, or that this calculation would for some (supernatural?) reason not have the same outcome if performed by something other than a human brain.
I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners make the polite assumption that it's also true for other similar beings.
How would you write a computer program that "tells that story to itself," such that it actually has an experience of the world, as opposed to just being a machine executing a program without any conscious awareness?
Edit: also, whether we're in charge of our thoughts is a separate question from whether we possess consciousness. Even if we're not in charge of our thoughts, we still have a conscious experience of them.
In fact, there's pretty good evidence that what we call consciousness is a post-facto rationalization of the subconscious brain processes that determine an automatic answer of your brain to stimulus (not that it makes them deterministic, but certainly they're not "rational" in the classic sense).
A perception that, divorced from all other facts, entails a false conclusion.
So your perception of conscious subjectivity could indeed be an illusion.
Put another way, how would you program a computer to have a perception of conscious subjectivity, as opposed to just blindly and unconsciously executing its instructions?
No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic.
We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve the illusion of parallelism, ie. context switching between internal and external mental models produces the illusion of consciousness.
[1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...
I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere.
The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definition, you assertion that 'conscious subjectivity is an illusion' is inconsistent, as an illusion is a complex form of perception that requires a consciousness to perceive it.
Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).
It's not really. Consciousness quite literally does not exist in mechanistic/eliminativist conceptions of consciousness like the link I provided, just like cars don't really exist because they aren't in the ontology of physics. My clarification of "assumption" is simply because many people don't know this.
> Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).
No, there is concurrency but not parallelism.
If I understand you correctly, that's a pretty harsh criterion for existence, isn't it? Even though a car is just a composite of metal atoms under a precise configuration and not a metaphysical entity on itself, you can still use it to drive you home. I suppose that makes me an utilitarian.
> No, there is concurrency but not parallelism.
You're right, my bad. I've forgotten my precision from my college days. Still, that's good enough for the program, just like my consciousness is good enough for me, even if it's entirely mechanistic and doesn't exist in the same way that cars don't exist.
If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck...
For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.
To come back to the original claim:
> Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing
We may not "know" of such a thing with certainty, but we have a strong candidate in consciousness.
There are two possibilities here:
One is that Turing machines are conscious (and we're monsters for what we do with them), in which case we still have an unexplained panpsychic phenomenon which we would need new science to understand.
The other is that Turing machines are not conscious, in which case there's an unexplained phenomenon in how an object like the brain can give rise to consciousness. In that case, the question of whether a Turing machine could in principle emulate consciousness depends on what the cause of consciousness is. It's certainly possible, and doesn't even seem particularly unlikely, that we find that Turing machines cannot do this, and that something other than "computation" is needed.
I don't have no reason or explanation that suggests that you have a consciousness either. You could be a very elaborate chatbot that posts coherent replies at online forums. Also, I do know whether I'm a chatbot myself or not, but you can't tell about me just from the replies written here.
> We may not "know" of such a thing with certainty, but we have a strong candidate in consciousness.
The problem with that is, you don't have a test for consciousness. There's a strong candidate in MRI brain scans (at least for humans), but you can't really be sure.
That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.